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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of social ties between the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and 
board members on corporate risk-taking in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and on shareholder 
value. Using a measure of CEO-director connections in a large sample of U.S. firms from 2000 to 
2010, we document that boardroom connections lower firm acquisitiveness. If connected CEOs 
undertake M&As, they are less likely to choose focus acquisitions, and more likely to pay in stock. 
CEO-board connections do not enhance firm value in M&As. Higher levels of boardroom 
connection are associated with lower announcement returns and lower subsequent return on assets. 
Our results are robust to alternative explanations and various robustness checks.   
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1. Introduction 
The value of a firm is the present value of its future cash flows, which result from 
investment projects. In an ideal world, corporate managers should take the risk of investing in new 
and profitable projects that increase shareholder value. However, a number of factors might prevent 
corporations from taking the right level of risk and undertaking optimal investment decisions. Myers 
and Majluf (1984) for example show that agency problems might create a situation when net present 
value (NPV)-positive projects are not pursued, leading to a general underinvestment that is not 
optimal for shareholder value. Shareholders should thus be concerned with providing managers with 
the right incentives to make value-enhancing investments. If NPV-positive investments increase the 
risk that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) will be fired, or the firm will be taken over, the CEO 
might refrain from investing out of a concern for his career (Coles et al. 2006, Low 2009). In 
contrast, governance literature is more concerned with the possibility that managers who over-invest 
in their pet-projects destroy firm value (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
In this paper, we investigate the impact of boardroom connection on mergers and 
acquisitions and on firm value in a large panel of U.S. firms from 2000 to 2010. Informal social links 
between top executives and directors are a prevalent feature in many countries (Useem 1984). In 
many cases, top executives enjoy an elite education, share membership in prestigious social and 
professional associations, and sit on the boards of large firms. This phenomenon leads Mills (1956, 
p. 294) to observe that the corporate elite “often seem to know one another, seem quite naturally to 
work together, and share many organizations in common.” We define boardroom connections by 
measuring the proportion of independent directors connected to the CEO through current 
employment, prior employment, education, and social activities (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008, 
Fracassi and Tate 2012).  
Little research exists, however, on whether and how informal and social relationships 
between a CEO and directors impact corporate investment decision and firm value. When a CEO 
and a number of directors belong to the same social networks, their connections might facilitate the 
exchange of information, empower the advisory role of boards of directors, and create mutual faith 
between the CEO and directors, leading to an optimal level of risk-taking that enhances firm value. 
A close boardroom relationship between a CEO and directors might incite the CEO not to take 
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risk, to take a lower than optimal level of risk, or the wrong type of risk. The overall impact of social 
ties between CEOs and directors thus remains an open empirical question.   
We focus on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as our key proxy for CEO risk-taking for 
several reasons. First, major M&As are often initiated by the CEO, and approved by the board. 
Boardroom ties are therefore relevant in this context. Second, M&As are major observable 
corporate investment decisions that change firm risk (Acharya et. al. 2011). Diversifying acquisitions, 
for example, broaden the revenue base across business segments in different industries whose cash 
flows are less correlated to each other, and therefore lower the firm’s idiosyncratic risk (Comment 
and Jarrell 1995). Diversifying acquisitions also represent managerial desire to lower corporate risks 
(Amihud and Lev 1981). On the contrary, focus acquisitions may strengthen a firm’s strategic 
position within the industry the firm resides in, and therefore prevent the firm from becoming a 
takeover target (Gordon et al 2010). Third, M&As carry considerable uncertainty both for the firm 
and the top managers. Bad acquisition decisions might cost a CEO his job (Lehn and Zhao 2006). 
Similarly, firms that make bad acquisitions might later become targets (Mitchell and Lehn 1990). 
Thus, through these decisions, we can better understand corporate risk-taking and its impact on 
shareholder value. Fourth, M&A characteristics are observable. We can thus study the impact of 
social ties between CEOs and directors on various M&A dimensions, such as the payment method, 
and the nature of the M&A operation (focus vs. diversifying). As managerial risk-taking can be 
unobservable, we also complement our study by relying on alternative proxies for risk-taking, such 
as stock return volatility and idiosyncratic risk. 
We find, first, that firms with connected boards are less likely to pursue mergers and 
acquisitions. Second, if they undertake M&As, they are less likely to choose focus acquisitions, and 
more likely to pay in stock. Third, social ties in the boardroom do not enhance firm value in the 
M&A context. A higher level of boardroom connection is associated with a lower level of short-
term stock performance and a lower subsequent return on assets (ROA). Connected CEOs are less 
likely to undertake value-creating acquisitions. Our results are robust to alternative specifications of 
the empirical model and alternative proxies for risk-taking. Overall, our results seem to support the 
“quiet life” hypothesis by Betrand and Mullinathan (2003) and Aggarwal and Samwick (2006). 
Insulated from board monitoring, socially connected CEOs appear to prefer not to take risk, or to 
take a low level of risk at the expense of shareholder value. When the CEOs acquire, the acquisitions 
seem defensive in nature, plausibly to fend off possible takeover. 
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 Our paper contributes to the literature along several lines. First, it studies the impact of 
social network on corporate risk-taking and shows that boardroom connections significantly impact 
corporate major investment decisions and firm value. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is 
among the first in finance to study this question.   
Second, evidence from this study might have implications for the ongoing debate on the 
independence and the effectiveness of boards of directors from both the research and regulatory 
points of view. Prior research and regulations focus on visible board and governance features and on 
disclosure rules and do not take into account sociological factors such as top executives’ social ties, 
which are, as this paper shows, less observable yet non-negligible determinants of board 
effectiveness.  
Third, results from this paper contribute to our understanding of corporate and managerial 
risk-taking, which is crucial in the value creation for shareholders. In relation to the current financial 
crisis, much has been discussed about the impact of managerial incentives to take an excessive level 
of risk. We show that, on the contrary, social connections in the boards of directors cause the CEOs 
to shirk the risk, reducing firm value. We thus join recent finance literature (Barber et al. 1995, 
Larcker et al. 2005, Hallock 1997, Barber and Palmer 2001, Cohen et al. 2008, Hochberg et al. 2007, 
2010, Barnea and Guedj 2007, Schmidt 2008, Kuhnen 2009, and Nguyen 2012) that provides 
evidence on the impact of social ties and points toward the broader prevalence of the influence of 
social linkages across numerous finance issues.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses extant literature on social networks 
and corporate risk-taking. Section 3 presents our data. Section 4 reports our empirical results on the 
relationship between board connectedness and risk-taking. Section 5 shows alternative explanations 
and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
One of the most important corporate decisions is the investment decision. As value 
enhancing projects are risky, investment decisions involve risk-taking. In principle, the managers 
must undertake the risky investments that increase firm value. Many factors impact the corporate 
risk-taking in investment decisions, leading potentially to a sub-optimal level of risk-taking or an 
excessive level of risk-taking.  
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Because the choice of projects alters the firm’s risk profile (Amihud and Lev 1981), self-
interest and risk-averse managers might thus want to lower firm risks and under-invest or invest in 
less risky projects. Higher firm risks might also put managerial firm-specific human capital (Smith 
and Stulz 1985) and their perquisite consumptions (Williams 1987) at stake. Consistent with this 
view, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) find that managers might prefer a quiet life instead of 
empire building. A well-designed executive compensation package might offer a solution to deal 
with this underinvestment problem (Coles et al. 2006, Low 2009, Armstrong and Vashishtha 2012, 
among others). On the other hand, corporate governance literature shows that poor governance 
might lead to overinvestment and/or inefficient investments in acquisition activities (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997, Harford et al. 2008, Masulis et al. 2009, Billet et al. 2011).  A recent and growing strand 
of literature provides evidence that personal characteristics of managers impact corporate 
investment policies. The personal characteristics that have been studied include CEO age (Betrand 
and Schoar 2003, Serfling, 2012); gender (Faccio et al. 2012); overconfidence (Malmendier et al. 
2011); political affiliations (Hutton et al. 2011); religions (Hilary and Hui 2009); and marriage 
(Roussanov and Savor 2012).  
Little research exists, however, on the impact of social networks in the boardroom on 
corporate major decisions. Fracassi and Tate (2012) find that boardroom ties are associated with 
lower firm value and higher propensity to engage in value-destroying acquisitions. Nguyen (2012) 
finds that CEOs connected to directors are less likely to be fired for poor performance and more 
likely to find an employment after being ousted. Using boardroom ties as a proxy for the board’s 
advisory role, Schmidt (2008) finds that board connectedness is positively related to M&A 
announcement returns for firms with high advisory needs. Cai and Selivir (2012) find that M&A 
transactions in which boards of the acquirer and the target are connected are associated with positive 
merger outcomes. In contrast, Ishii and Xuan (2010) find a negative relation between acquirer-target 
social ties and merger returns. 
Our study relies both on a large body of sociological literature on the social networks of top 
executives (see, for example, Useem 1984, Milgram 1967, Wasserman and Faust 1997, Watts 1999, 
and Pfeffer and Salancik 2003), and on a growing body of literature that provides empirical evidence 
on the impact of social networks in management, finance, and economics. Barber et al. (1995) 
provide evidence that acquisitions in the U.S. during the 1960s were partly influenced by the 
position of a firm’s managers and directors in the social network of the business elite. Simon and 
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Warner (1992) argue that “old boy” networks reduce employers’ uncertainty about worker 
productivity. Workers hired through such networks earn higher initial salaries and stay on the job 
longer than do comparable workers hired from outside the network. Kramarz and Thesmar (2012) 
find that a board dominated by members of a network in France tends to favor the recruitment of 
new directors from the same network. Hallock (1997), Larcker et al. (2005), and Barnea and Guedj 
(2007) report evidence that connections between directors and top executives are related to 
executive compensation. Cohen et al. (2008) find that portfolio managers overweigh firms they are 
connected to through their networks of shared education. Hochberg et al. (2007, 2010) show that 
venture capital’s social networks influence investment performance. Kuhnen (2009) reports that ties 
between fund directors and advisory firms cause preferential hiring, but do not significantly impact 
fund investors’ welfare. Schmidt (2008) finds that social ties between the CEO and boards impact 
bidder announcement returns in mergers and acquisitions.       
       
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data  
Our sample includes S&P1500 firms covered by BoardEx between 2000 and 20101
We obtain biographical information of senior company officers and directors from BoardEx 
database of Management Diagnostics Limited. The BoardEx database contains the current and past 
roles of board members and senior executives at both active and inactive firms (including the start 
and end dates of those roles), all undergraduate and graduate degrees attained (including the year in 
which those degrees were awarded and the awarding institution), and social activities (including 
memberships in clubs, as well as positions held at various foundations, charitable groups, and 
endowment funds). To verify the identity of the CEO, we match CEO names in BoardEx with 
. We 
collect the data in this study from several sources. Stock prices and returns are from CRSP, and 
accounting data are from Compustat Annual. The two datasets are merged using CRSP-Compustat 
link file provided by CRSP.  
                                                          
1 BoardEx data cover SEC mandated and non-mandated information, such as education and non-for-profit activities. 
The disclosure quality is consistent on S&P 1500 firms. Coverage before 2000 is limited. Similar to prior literature 
(Engelberg et al. 2012, Do et al. 2012, Fracassi and Tate 2012), we thus choose the sample from 2000 onwards. 
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those in ExecuComp using the Levenstein algorithm (after the initial match at firm-level). 2
BoardEx covers both active and inactive firms. The database has the International Security 
Identification Number (ISIN), ticker symbol, and the company name as identifiers. However, the 
ISIN and ticker symbol may be missing for inactive firms. In these cases, we match the most recent 
company name provided by BoardEx with the most recent company name in CRSP using 
Levenshtein algorithm. Again, we manually verify each match to ensure the quality of the matching 
procedure. The final sample has 3,049 unique CEOs, from 1,822 unique firms. 
 We 
manually check these matches.  
We identify connections between the CEO and a director through current employment, 
prior employment, education, and social activities. Current employment connection exists when 
both the director and CEO currently serve in at least one common firm outside of the firm in 
question. Typically, such connections are common directorships in an outside firm. Prior 
employment connection exists when both the director and CEO served in at least one common 
company in the past (excluding prior roles in the company in question). Education connection exists 
when the director and CEO attended the same university program within a year. We classify 
university programs into one of the six types: (1) Undergraduate, (2) Masters, (3) MBA, (4) Ph.D., 
(5) Law, and (6) Other, as is similar to the classifications in Cohen et al. (2008), Engelberg et al. 
(2012), and Do et al. (2012a, 2012b). Finally, social activity connection exists when the director and 
CEO share active membership in at least one non-profit organization (Fracassi and Tate 2012).3
BoardEx data come from different sources, including discretionary disclosure, press releases, 
and company websites. The quality of non-mandated information on education and non-for-profit 
activities thus might vary. To alleviate this issue, we restrict our analysis to prominent companies in 
the S&P1500, whose quantity and quality of available director information is likely to be more 
comparable. Our estimation technique uses within-firm variations to identify the effect of 
 A 
board member can be connected to the CEO through current employment, prior employment, 
education, and/or social activity. Our main measure of boardroom connection at firm level is the 
fraction of directors connected to the CEO measured one year before the fiscal year in 
consideration (variable Connectedness (%) in tables).  
                                                          
2 Levenshtein algorithm computes the least number of operations necessary to modify one string to another string. For 
example, two perfectly matched strings will require zero steps to modify one string to the other. 
3 Active role requires that the role description to be more than just “members” of organizations, except clubs. Frequent 
examples of active roles are “Trustee,” “President,” “Advisor,” and “Board Member.” As BoardEx does not report 
starting/ending dates for the majority of social activities, we do not require positions to occur at the same time. 
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boardroom ties on firm acquisitiveness, and controls for time fixed effects, allowing us to remove 
potential time-varying firm heterogeneity. 
The distribution of BoardEx missing data might still be non-random; data might more likely 
be missing, for example, for smaller firms and for older directors with longer tenure on their boards, 
as a result of a lack of data on directors with no higher education (Fracassi and Tate 2012). To 
address this issue, we control for firm size, director age, and director tenure in our regressions. 
Another potential issue is the difference in disclosure quality across directors within the same board. 
Such differences are limited because BoardEx uses the same search procedure for each individual. 
Furthermore, firms in practice impose the same disclosure practice of director information; for 
example, director education or other activities information is either disclosed for all directors or 
none. Eventually, any missing ties between CEO and board should attenuate our estimated 
differences between the treated and the control sample, which also includes directors with missing 
information. Indeed, we find that our key estimates are larger when we restrict our sample to firms 
that are part of S&P500. 
Our M&A sample is extracted from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers 
and Acquisitions database between 2000 and 2010. We include all completed M&As for U.S. targets 
and acquirers with an explicit change of control. The acquirer must purchase 50% or more of the 
target’s shares in the transaction and own less than 50% of the target prior to the transaction. 
Following Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki (2011), our sample selection is based on the following 
steps: 
Step 1: All acquisitions from 01/01/2000 to 12/31/2010. 
Step 2: Disclosed Mergers and Acquisitions (Deal Type: 1). 
Step 3: Deal Status is “Completed.” 
Step 4: Percentage of Shares Acquired in Transaction: 50 to HI. 
Step 5: Percentage of Shares Held by Acquirer Six Months Prior to Announcement: 0 to 49. 
We further require that the deal value disclosed is at least $1 million, or more than 1% of the 
acquirer’s market capitalization on the 41th trading day prior to announcement date (Masulis et al 
2007, Schmidt 2008). Our final sample includes 2,897 M&As. Our sample differs from Fracassi and 
Tate (2012) in size and control. We include acquisitions involving private, subsidiary, and public 
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targets with transactions of at least $1 million, or more than 1% of the acquirer’s market 
capitalization, while Fracassi and Tate (2012) include only M&As involving public targets of at least 
$10 million4
 
. The inclusion of both private and subsidiary targets offers a more complete picture of 
firm acquisitiveness and M&A strategy because three times more acquisitions involve private and 
subsidiary targets than involve public target alone, and about 96% of these acquisitions involve 
transactions of more than $10 million. We include completed change-in-control M&As, while 
Fracassi and Tate’s (2012) sample may include acquisitions that do not change corporate control.  
3.2. BoardEx panel data 
Table 1 shows summary statistics of S&P1500 firm-year panel data from BoardEx. The 
panel data contains 13,560 observations. Our data are broadly similar to Fracassi and Tate (2012). 
Panel A provides summary statistics of CEO-Board connectedness. On average, 19.2% of 
independent directors and 18.6% of all directors are connected to the CEO5
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
. The most common 
type of connection is through past employment (11.8% of directors), while the least is education 
(0.4%).  
Panel B of Table 1 presents CEO characteristics. Average CEO age and tenure are 55.6 and 
5.2 years, respectively. The mean fraction of CEO pay over the top 5 executives is 37.6%, a level 
consistent with Bebchuk et al. (2011). When comparing summary statistics for subsamples of firms 
with above and below the sample median of boardroom connectedness, we find that firms with 
more-connected boards have older and longer-serving CEOs who also capture a higher fraction of 
the pay of the top five executives in the firm.  
Panels C and D of Table 1 report board and firm characteristics. Average director age and 
tenure are 59.9 and 8.6 years, respectively. The average number of directors on a board is 9.7, of 
which 75% are statutorily independent. Notably, more-connected boards are larger and more 
independent, but include older directors having shorter tenure. More-connected firms are larger. 
They have lower cash flow, and Tobin’s Q, but higher book leverage. More-connected firms tend to 
                                                          
4 Our sample size for acquisitions involving public targets for the same sample period is comparable to that of Fracassi 
and Tate (2012). 
5 63.1% of firms in our sample have at least one director connected to the CEO through one of the four types of 
connections. 
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reside in more competitive industries. Our statistics are fairly similar to those of Fracassi and Tate 
(2012).  
Panel E of Table 1 presents the pairwise correlations of our main measure of social ties 
between CEOs and independent directors, Connectedness (%), measured one year before a fiscal year 
in consideration, and its four constituents (past employment, current employment, education, and 
social activity). All the pairwise correlations are positive and significant, except education-current 
employment and education-past employment. The positive correlation between education and social 
activity suggests, for example, that a director and a CEO who attended the same university program 
are also more likely to be on the board of trustees for the same endowment fund in the future.  
To illustrate the variations in board connectedness, consider ExxonMobil's board of 
directors. In 2001, CEO Lee Raymond has social ties with 90% of the statutorily independent 
directors - 70% through past employment ties, 10% through common outside directorships, and 
50% through social activities. In comparison, the average proportion of socially connected 
independent directors among ExxonMobil’s peers is only 26%. Therefore, there is substantial cross-
sectional variation. There is also variation across time in ExxonMobil’s board. In 2002, for example, 
Doctor Henry McKinnell who is connected to Mr. Raymond joins the board, thus increasing the 
proportion of independent directors connected to the CEO.  
 
3.3. Sample of mergers and acquisitions  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of our M&A sample. Similar to Netter et al. (2011), 
Panel A shows a gradual increase in M&A activities from 2000 to 2007, followed by a decline during 
the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. Similar to Schmidt (2008) and Netter et al. (2011), we find that 
public targets (25.3%) are less common than private and subsidiary targets, diversifying acquisitions 
(39.4%) are less common than focus acquisitions, and all-cash payments (40.5%) are more common 
than stock payment.  
[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
Panel B of Table 2 reports deal characteristics. The mean and the median value of 
transactions are $923 million and $150 million, respectively. The large difference between the mean 
and median is driven by a number of very large acquirers and deals. The mean and the median of 
relative deal value are 14.8% and 5.6%, respectively, comparable to figures from Masulis et al. (2007) 
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and Harford et al. (2012). More-connected boards tend to undertake larger deals, both in terms of 
transaction value and relative deal value; to pay acquisitions with all stock; and to acquire public 
targets.  
Panel C of Table 2 describes acquiring firms’ boardroom connectedness. It shows that 
18.9% of independent directors and 18.3% of directors are socially connected to the CEO6
Panels D, E, and F report CEO, board, and firm characteristics of the sample of acquiring 
firms. Acquiring CEOs with a higher level of boardroom connectedness tend to be older, longer 
serving, and better paid relative to the other top 5 executives within the firm. 
. Our 
measures of acquiring firms’ boardroom connectedness are broadly similar to the overall sample.  
 
4. Empirical results 
In this section, we first study the impact of boardroom connection on corporate propensity 
to acquire. We then examine its impact on the propensity to pursue focus acquisitions, the choice of 
method of payment, the acquirer’s announcement return and the change in operating performance, 
and the propensity to engage in value-creating M&As. Finally, we discuss the robustness of these 
results.  As CEO preferences influence corporate behavior (Weisbach 1995, Chevalier and Ellison 
1999, Betrand and Schoar 2003, Aggarwal and Samwick 2003, Malmendier and Tate 2005, etc.), we 
require in all empirical tests that the CEO in year t is the same as the CEO in year t-1.7
 
 Our findings 
are virtually unaffected if we relax this condition.  
4.1. Boardroom connections and the likelihood of mergers and acquisitions    
We identify the effect of social ties on firm acquisitiveness by using a logit regression that 
accounts for both cross-sectional and within-firm variation. However, the effect of boardroom 
connection on firm acquisitiveness may be challenging to interpret because of endogeneity concern. 
For example, CEOs may appoint independent directors with pre-existing relationships prior to an 
acquisition to facilitate deal approval or to gather information about a prospective target. To address 
this concern, we use a second estimation procedure, a first-difference panel regression with an 
instrumental variable to identify within-firm variations of boardroom ties on firm acquisitiveness. 
                                                          
6 64.6% of the acquirers have a board with at least one director connected to the CEO. 
7 Consequently, the total number of observations drops from 13,560 to 10,433, M&A deals from 2,897 to 2,339. 
  11 
 
We employ the death of connected independent directors (Deceased Connected Independent Director) as 
the instrument to account for the endogeneity of boardroom connectedness in our baseline 
regressions (Fracassi and Tate 2012). The instrument, Deceased Connected Independent Director, counts 
the number of independent directors with ties to the CEO who have died within one year up to the 
current fiscal year. Our estimates depend on within-firm changes in boardroom connectedness 
around the deaths of independent director as identification. Specifically, the identification comes 
from differences in firm acquisitiveness of the step functions defined by the instrument. In the first 
stage, we regress the first-difference of Connectedness (%) on the first-difference of the instrument and 
of our prior set of control variables. In the second stage, we regress the first-difference of the binary 
indicator of merger activity during the fiscal year on the first-difference of controls and of 
Connectedness (%) predicted by the first stage regression. The first-difference panel regression with 
instrumental variable approach eliminates both time-invariant firm effect on firm acquisitiveness and 
addresses the endogeneity of boardroom connection. 
To study whether boardroom connection impacts the propensity to acquire, we first rely on 
a binomial logit model. Our main dependent variable is an indicator for whether a firm completes at 
least one M&A deal in excess of $1 million or 1% of its market capitalization during a fiscal year. 
Our main independent variable is Connectedness (%), measured as the percentage of independent 
directors connected to the CEO over the total number of independent directors one year before a 
fiscal year in consideration. As a robustness check, we also use Connectedness (%), but measure two 
year before a fiscal year. We obtain sensible similar result, as presented in Table 8. Table 3 reports 
the regression results. 
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
In column (1), we regress the dependent variable on our main proxy for boardroom 
connection (Connectedness (%)) and on various determinants of M&A activities such as firm 
characteristics, board characteristics, and CEO characteristics. We find a negative coefficient of 
0.314, significant at the 5% level, on Connectedness (%). The standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and unspecified within-firm correlation. CEOs closely connected to board 
members appear less likely to undertake mergers and acquisitions. The coefficient on firm size is 
positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that larger firms are more likely to acquire other 
firms. The coefficient on Tobin’s Q is negative and significant, suggesting that acquisitions may be 
substitutes for profitable investment opportunities. Coefficient on cash flow is significantly positive, 
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while coefficient on leverage is significantly negative. Firms with lower financial constraints are thus 
more likely to acquire. The impact of firm characteristics on firm acquisitiveness is consistent with 
findings in prior literature (Malmendier and Tate 2005, and Fracassi and Tate 2012). 
Our finding of a negative effect of boardroom connection on the propensity to undertake 
mergers and acquisitions appears to contradict Fracassi and Tate’s (2012) finding. Potential 
explanations are manifold. First, as mentioned in the previous section, our mergers and acquisitions 
sample is different. We include all targets (public, private, and subsidiary). We note that three times 
more acquisitions involve private and subsidiary targets than involve public target alone, and about 
96% of these acquisitions involve transactions of more than $10 million. Fracassi and Tate (2012) 
use M&A as a proxy for board monitoring intensity, and include only public targets. Restricting our 
M&A sample to public targets, we find a positive and significant estimate, as in Table VI of Fracassi 
and Tate (2012).  
Column (2) includes year fixed effects to address the possibility of within-year merger 
clustering. The effect of boardroom connectedness on firm acquisitiveness remains significantly 
negative. Column (3) adds industry fixed effects to address the possibility of within-industry merger 
clustering (Andrade et al. 2001). Our estimate of the impact of CEO-board connection is not 
impacted. The effects of industry controls appear to be largely orthogonal to the effect of 
boardroom ties.  
Column (4) includes the interaction term Connectedness (%) x Merger Wave, whose coefficient is 
significantly positive. This suggests that boardroom connectedness induces more acquisitions when 
the firm’s industry experiences a merger wave, plausibly to grow bigger so to preempt being taken 
over (Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen 2009). 
As mentioned earlier in this subsection, the CEO-board connections might be endogenous 
to firm acquisitiveness. We thus address both firm heterogeneity and possible endogeneity between 
boardroom ties and firm acquisitiveness using first-difference panel regression using the death of 
connected independent director as the instrumental variable. Two-stage first-difference panel data 
allow us to identify the effect of boardroom ties on firm acquisitiveness using a subset of within-
firm changes in boardroom connection caused by deaths of connected independent directors. 
Column (5) reports the first-stage estimation. As expected, the death instrument has a strong 
negative impact on boardroom connectedness. A Wald statistic rejects at 1% the null hypothesis that 
the instrument has no effect on the endogenous variable. Column (6) reports the second-stage 
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estimation. Similar to previous estimations, the effect of boardroom connectedness on firm 
acquisitiveness is negative, but marginally significant.  
In sum, results from Table 3 show that social ties between the CEO and board members 
significantly diminish the propensity of firms to undertake merger and acquisition activity. 
Connected CEOs are less likely to undertake empire-building mergers and acquisitions. However, 
boardroom connectedness heightens firm acquisitiveness during merger wave, suggesting that CEOs 
are more likely to conduct defensive acquisitions with friends on board to fend off prospective 
acquirers when the perceived threat of being taken over is high. Overall, risk-shirking incentives 
seem to dominate risk-taking incentives in the presence of CEO-director connections. The higher 
propensity to acquire during merger wave may result from weaker board monitoring. This evidence 
appears to support the “quiet life” hypothesis of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). Boardroom 
connections might reduce the efficiency of board monitoring (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998), make 
the CEO feel safe in the job (Hwang and Kim 2009; Nguyen 2012), and insulate him from pressure 
to take the right type of risk to enhance firm value in the long term.  
 
4.2. Boardroom connections and focus mergers and acquisitions  
Agency theory argues that managers might make decisions that increase their own utility and 
deviate from the shareholders’ interest (Jensen and Meckling 1976). A CEO may derive utility from 
diversifying acquisition because of the better prestige and career prospect associated with a more 
diversified firm (Jensen 1986, Stulz 1990). Managers, as Amihud and Lev (1981) show, have the 
incentive to diversify their firm to lower their employment risks. On the contrary, a CEO might 
want to undertake specific investments to further entrench himself, making him indispensable, 
allowing him to extract rents, and reducing the probability of dismissal (Shleifer and Vishny 1989).  
Boards of directors are supposed to provide a CEO with the right incentive to pursue 
shareholder-value enhancing deals in mergers and acquisitions. However, the ultimate impact of 
CEO-board ties on the propensity of CEOs to undertake focus or diversifying acquisitions is 
unclear. If boardroom connection enhances the board’s advisory role (Adams and Ferreira 2007), 
the propensity to engage in value-creating focus acquisitions should be higher. If boardroom 
connection weakens the board’s monitoring role (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998), managerial self-
interest will dominate the choice. Managers will conduct either diversifying acquisitions to lower 
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employment risk (Amihud and Lev 1981) or enhance their career prospects (Jensen 1986, Stulz 
1990), or focus acquisitions to make themselves more indispensable (Shleifer and Vishny 1989).  
We explore this question in this sub-section by using a logit regression and first-difference 
panel regression with the death of connected independent director as the instrumental variable. The 
dependent variable is an indicator for whether a firm in BoardEx dataset completes at least one 
focus merger or acquisition during the fiscal year. Similar to prior literature, we define focus M&As 
as the ones that involve a target in industries with the same two-digit SIC code to the acquirer. Table 
4 shows the regression results.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 Column (1) shows that the coefficient on Connectedness (%) is negative, and statistically 
significant. Boardroom ties are associated with lower propensity to conduct focus acquisitions, 
consistent with agency theory.  
The previous section suggests that board connectedness is associated with defensive 
acquisitions when the perceived threat of being taken over is high. To fend off possible takeover 
within the industry as argued in Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen (2009), a firm has to grow larger within its 
industry. Therefore, the relationship between boardroom connectedness and the propensity to 
conduct focus acquisitions should be positive during times of heightened vulnerability to takeover. 
Column (2) tests this conjecture by including the interaction term Connectedness (%) x Merger Wave 
Indeed, we find that connected firms are more likely to pursue same-industry acquisitions during a 
merger wave, supporting Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen’s (2009) “eat or be eaten” hypothesis.   
Next, we address both firm heterogeneity and possible endogeneity between boardroom 
connectedness and the propensity to conduct focus acquisitions using first-difference panel 
regression with instrumental variable. Column (3) reports the second-stage estimation. Similar to 
previous estimations, the effect of boardroom connectedness on firm propensity to conduct focus 
acquisition is negative. 
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4.3. Boardroom connections and the choice of payment methods in mergers and 
acquisitions  
In this sub-section, we study the impact of boardroom connections on the choice of 
payment methods in M&As. From the agency theory perspective, the propensity to conduct stock-
financed acquisitions, broadly seen as value-destroying for the acquiring firms, should be higher with 
a lower level of board monitoring. From a risk-taking perspective, risk-averse CEOs are likely to 
choose stock-financed acquisitions because of the uncertainty over the post-acquisition changes in 
firm value. Hansen’s (1987) model predicts that, under asymmetric information, the acquirer 
chooses to use stock when the information asymmetry between the acquirer and target is high, as 
stock financing forces the target to share post-acquisition revaluation effects. Empirical evidence 
from Martin (1996) and Faccio and Masulis (2005) confirm this risk-sharing hypothesis. Thus, the 
choice of payment reveals an acquiring firm’s aversion to the uncertainty over merger outcome. 
Both agency and risk-taking perspectives predict a positive association between boardroom ties and 
the propensity to finance with stocks. 
We investigate if boardroom connections impact the choice of financing of M&A deals with 
stock (Martin 1996, Faccio and Masulis 2005). We estimate a double-sided Tobit (censored at 0 and 
1) to explain the percentage of equity financing of each deal. We include the Inverse Mills Ratio to 
control for possible sample selection. Table 5 reports regression results.  
 [Insert Table 5 about here]   
Column (1) shows that the marginal effect of the Connectedness (%)  is positive and significant 
at 5%. Firms with lower cash flows are more likely to pay stocks. This result confirms Jung, Kim, 
and Stulz (1996) and Martin (1996). Firms with larger board and lower percentage of independent 
directors, and longer CEO tenure tend to pay acquisitions with more stocks, suggesting the positive 
association between poor corporate governance and the propensity to conduct stock-financed 
acquisitions.  
We examine the effect of industry dynamics on the relationship between boardroom ties and 
the propensity to pay with stocks. Column (2) examines the interaction term Connectedness (%) x 
Merger Wave, the coefficient is positive and significant. Boardroom connectedness thus increases the 
propensity to pay with stocks during industry-specific merger wave. Uncertainty rises with industry-
specific merger wave, and CEOs have vested interest to keep their firm independent to preserve 
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their private benefits of controls. Therefore, the positive effect of boardroom connectedness on the 
propensity to pay with stocks during merger wave is expected. Column (3) includes the interaction 
term Connectedness (%) x HHI (Herfindahl Index, measured as the sum of the squares of market share 
of each firm in the same three-digit SIC), the coefficient is significantly negative. Boardroom 
connectedness is thus associated with a greater propensity to pay with stocks for firms residing in 
competitive industries, whose outlook is more uncertain. Finally, column (4) includes the interaction 
term Connectedness (%) x Focus. We obtain a positive and significant coefficient. This is consistent with 
the positive effect of boardroom connectedness on the propensity to conduct focus acquisitions to 
achieve larger scale within an industry during merger wave to preempt the possibility of being taken 
over. 
In summary, results from Table 5 provide evidence that the more socially connected a CEO 
and his board of directors are, the more likely the firm will finance mergers and acquisitions with 
stocks. This tendency seems to concentrate among acquirers in an industry undergoing a merger 
wave, and in competitive industries, whose future outlook is more uncertain on the basis of product 
market competition. Furthermore, boardroom connectedness increases the propensity to pay focus 
acquisitions with stocks, supporting the positive effect boardroom connectedness has on the 
propensity to conduct defensive acquisitions during times of heightened vulnerability. 
In sum, results from Table 5 show that CEO-board connections appear to induce CEOs to 
finance acquisitions by stocks. This evidence supports our findings in Table 3 and Table 4 and is 
consistent with the quiet life hypothesis put forward by Betrand and Mullinathan (2003) and 
Aggarwal and Samwick (2006). However, this sub-section cannot tell us whether this risk “shirking” 
is good or bad for firm value. We will answer this question in the following sub-section. 
 
4.4. Acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns and change in operating performance 
We have so far shown that social ties between CEOs and directors reduce managerial risk-
taking. However, if conservative risk-taking is value-enhancing, this behavior is not necessarily bad 
for shareholder value. This sub-section will investigate the wealth impact of boardroom connections. 
 We first examine stock price reactions to the announcement of M&As. We follow Brown 
and Warner’s (1985) standard event study methodology to calculate cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) in the 2-day window surrounding the announcement (day 0). Using CRSP value-weighted 
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returns as the market return, we estimate the market model parameters over 200 trading days, ending 
two months before the M&A announcement day, and compare CAR among sub-samples of firms. 
Results are reported in Panel A of Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Markets generally react positively and significantly to M&A announcements.  The average 
(median) CAR is 0.26% (0.16%), significant at the 5% level. This result is consistent with Masulis et 
al. (2007). Markets react positively and significantly to the announcement of focus deals, with an 
average (median) CAR of 0.35% (0.21%), significant at the 5% level. Focus deals seem to be value 
creating for shareholders. In contrast, no significant stock price reaction to the announcement of 
diversification deals occurs.    
We use the median of boardroom connection to divide our sample into sub-samples of 
more- or less-connected boards. For the sub-sample of acquiring firms with more-connected boards, 
the CARs are insignificant (the mean and median CARs are -0.02% and -0.12%, respectively, both 
insignificant). By contrast, for less-connected boards, the mean and median CARs are 0.55% and 
0.40%, respectively, both are significant at 1%. More interestingly, the differences in mean and 
median of the CARs between these two sub-samples are significant at the 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. M&As by less-connected boards seem to create significantly more value to 
shareholders. We find similar results with subsamples of focus and diversifying acquisitions. The 
difference between CARs of these two groups of firms is significant. Focus acquisitions by less-
connected boards significantly create more shareholder value than do focus deals by more-
connected boards.  
Evidence from Panel A of Table 6 shows that M&A deals and focus acquisition deals by 
connected boards do not create value for shareholders, while deals by less-connected boards do. 
Moreover, the difference in value creation in M&As between more- and less-connected firms is 
statistically significant.  
Results from Panel A of Table 6 remain however univariate. We next develop our analysis of 
the impact of boardroom connection on stock price performance and operating performance in a 
multivariate framework. Panel B of Table 6 reports results of OLS regression of the acquirer’s CAR 
and change in operating performance (ROA) around M&A announcement on our measure of social 
ties, Connectedness (%), and control variables. We control for acquirer and deal characteristics known 
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in the literature to affect acquirer returns (see, for example, Masulis et al. 2007, Cai and Selivir 2012, 
Harford et al. 2012). Acquirer’s characteristics include market capitalization, Tobin's Q, leverage 
(book value of debts over market value of total assets), and cash flow (scaled by lagged total assets). 
Deal characteristics include relative deal size (transaction value over acquirer's market capitalization), 
indicator for public target, indicator for all stock payment, stock run-up (buy-and-hold abnormal 
return during the period [-210,-11]), indicator variables for tender offer, cross-border, competed 
(more than one bidder), merger of equals, high tech combinations (Loughran and Ritter 2004), serial 
acquirer (more than three acquisitions during the sample period), and indicator for governance 
(taking value of 1 if Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk et al. 2009) is greater than the median).  
Columns (1) to (3) report the results with CARs from windows of 3 days, 5 days, and 7 days 
around the M&A announcement, respectively, as dependent variables. We find consistently negative 
and significant coefficients of similar magnitude on Connectedness (%). This indicates that firms with 
more-connected boards are associated with lower announcement returns. For column (1) for 
example, the coefficient on Connectedness (%) is -0.024, significant at the 1% level. The interaction 
term (Connectedness (%) x Focus) is positive and significant. Therefore, firms with strong boardroom 
connectedness are perceived to destroy value in M&As, but the effect is mitigated in focus 
acquisitions. For acquirers engaging in focus deals, one standard deviation increase in Connectedness 
(%) increases 3-day cumulative abnormal returns by about 1%. Consistent with extant literature, in 
columns (1) to (3), we find that the market reacts positively to M&A announcements by bidders that 
are smaller, with lower Tobin’s Q, with lower stock price run-up, and with deals combining two 
high-tech companies (Masulis, Wang, and Xie 2007, and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004). 
In column (4) of Panel B, we investigate the impact of boardroom connections on firm 
operating performance, i.e., on the change in returns on assets (ROA) from Year – 1 to Year + 1. 
Similar to the results with CARs, the estimate coefficient on Connectedness (%) is -0.031, significant at 
the 5% level. This result indicates that a higher level of board connectedness is associated with a 
lower ROA in the year following the M&A deal. 
In summary, Table 6 provides evidence that CEO-board social ties do not enhance firm 
value in M&A context. A higher level of boardroom connection is associated with a lower level of 
short-term stock performance and a lower subsequent ROA.     
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4.5. Decisions to conduct value-creating (destroying) acquisitions 
 In this section, we examine whether a high level of CEO-director connection predicts better 
acquisition decisions ex-ante. We divide our acquisition sample into two groups of value-creating 
and destroying acquisitions based on the 5-day cumulative abnormal returns around the M&A 
announcement.  
We estimate a multinomial logit model with the dependent variable being an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if a firm announces an change-in-control acquisition causing negative 
announcement return (D_Acq=1, Value-Destroying), which is subsequently completed, and 2 if the 
firm makes an acquisition that results in positive announcement return (D_Acq=2, Value-Creating). 
We use non-acquirers as the benchmark group, and set the dependent variable to 0 (D_Acq=0). For 
acquirers with multiple acquisitions in a fiscal year, we use the deal-value-weighted average returns to 
identify the indicator variable. In another unreported model, we use median cumulative abnormal 
return as the cutoff point, separating good from bad acquisitions. The results are virtually 
unchanged. Table 7 presents our findings.   
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
In model (1), the dependent variable for column (1) is D_Acq=1, which represents value-
destroying (negative announcement return) acquisition decisions. The coefficient on Connectedness (%) 
is negative, but insignificant. The dependent variable for column (2) is D_Acq=2, representing 
value-creating acquisition decisions. The coefficient on Connectedness (%) is negative and significant. 
Higher boardroom connectedness is associated with lower propensity to engage in value-creating 
acquisitions, lending support to the notion that acquisitions made by firms with strong boardroom 
connectedness are defensive in nature. Model (2) includes the interaction term Connectedness (%) x 
Merger Wave. Column (3) shows that higher boardroom connectedness is associated with higher 
propensity to engage in value-destroying acquisitions in the presence of merger wave.  
Overall, the evidence supports the hypothesis that boardroom connectedness is associated 
with managers’ tendency to engage in defensive acquisitions to avoid being taken over, and hence to 
protect their private benefits of control. 
     
 
  20 
 
 
 
 
5. Alternative explanations and robustness tests 
5.1. Alternative explanations 
 In this section, we examine possible channels that may influence our results, specifically 
board financial expertise, corporate governance, and CEO characteristics. Panel A of Table 8 reports 
the results. 
Board financial expertise 
Güner et al. (2008) document that financial expertise within the boardroom is associated 
with worse acquisitions, while Minton et al. (2010) find that having financial expertise on the board 
of financial institutions is associated with more risk-taking. To test the possibility that financial 
expertise may drive our results, we construct two measures of financial expertise: financial 
experience and financial education. Financial experience (%) is the fraction of directors with past or 
current experience as a CFO, treasurer, accountant, or vice president for finance. Financial education 
(%) is the fraction of directors with an MBA, CPA, CFA, or a degree in economics, management, 
accounting, or business. Column (1) shows that the impact of financial experience is positively 
related to firm acquisitiveness, but insignificant. Column (2) shows that financial education is 
positively but and significantly related to firm acquisitiveness. Our coefficient of interest on 
Connectedness (%) remains significantly negative and significant in the presence of board with financial 
expertise.   
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Corporate governance 
 Mitchell and Lehn (1990) find that markets for corporate control discourage empire building 
because firms making bad acquisitions are more likely to be acquired later. However, Masulis et al. 
(2007) argue that antitakeover provisions protect managers from disciplinary market actions, and 
encourage managerial empire building. We test the effect of anti-takeover provisions on firm 
acquisitiveness. Column (3) controls for managerial entrenchment constructed by Bebchuk et al. 
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2009. The effect of managerial entrenchment is positive and significant. The negative effect of 
CEO-board ties on M&A activities nevertheless remains significant. 
 Amihud and Lev (1981) find that the presence of blockholders mitigates risk-reducing 
investments, for example, diversifying acquisitions. Anderson and Reeb (2003) document that block 
positions held by founder families are associated with higher operating risk. Faccio et al. (2011) show 
that diversified large shareholders wield positive impact on corporate risk taking. Column (4) 
controls for institutional shareholdings (defined as the fraction of shares owned by institutional 
investors as disclosed in 13F filings). The effect of institutional shareholdings is positive and 
significant. To the extent that institutional investors are large and diversified, this finding is 
consistent with Faccio et al.  (2011). Our main coefficient of interest is not affected. 
CEO characteristics 
 Managerial shareholdings may influence CEO risk-taking behavior. May (1995) finds that 
firms with higher managerial equity ownership tend to pursue diversifying acquisitions.  In contrast, 
Denis et al. (1997) find that firms with higher managerial equity ownership have less diversification, 
suggesting that higher equity ownership may offset the private benefits managers derive from 
diversifying. Column (5) controls for CEO shareholdings. The negative effect of CEO-board ties is 
virtually unchanged. CEO shareholding has no effect on a firm’s propensity to acquire. 
 Powerful CEOs may push their agenda through, with or without friends in the boardroom. 
One proxy for CEO power is CEO pay slice, which is the fraction of CEO pay over the top 5 
executives (Bebchuk et al. 2011). CEO pay slice, as Bebchuk et al. (2011) argue, is a good proxy for 
agency costs. Column (6) controls for CEO pay slice. The impact of CEO pay slice on firm 
acquisitiveness is significantly positive. The negative effect of social ties remains robust. 
 CEOs may have different risk preferences, which affect corporate investment policies 
(Malmendier and Tate 2008, Malmendier et al. 2011, Cain and McKeon 2012).  For example, Cain 
and McKeon (2012) find that the propensity of CEOs with pilot licenses to acquire may relate to a 
sensation-seeking personality trait. Following their study, we use Federal Aviation Administration 
data to identify a subset of CEOs with small aircraft pilot licenses. Column (7) includes a dummy for 
CEOs with flying licenses. Our coefficient on Connectedness (%) remains negative and significant.    
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5.2. Robustness tests 
We examine the sensitivity of our results to alternative outcomes, measures of boardroom 
connectedness, and alternative samples. Panel B of Table 8 reports the results. 
Alternative outcome variables  
First, we deal with the possible concern that small acquisitions may not require the direct 
involvement of the board or the CEO, which is an assumption we make to infer the effect of CEO-
board ties. To address this concern, we redefine the takeover indicator variable to represent larger 
deals, from $1 million (or 1% of acquirer’s market capitalization) to $5 million, and to $10million, 
respectively. Column (1) of Panel B redefines the indicator variable for M&A as acquisitions with 
deal values of at least $5 million (see, for example, Morck et al. 1990 and Malmendier and Tate 
2005). The negative impact of CEO-board ties remains robust, and the estimate is very similar. 
Column (2) redefines the indicator variable to represent deal values of at least $10 million (Fracassi 
and Tate 2012). Our coefficient of interest remains negative and significant. Our results are 
therefore not sensitive to the size of M&As. 
Alternative measures of boardroom connectedness 
 We test three alternative measures of boardroom connectedness, namely the fraction of 
independent directors connected to the CEO through current employment, the fraction of directors 
connected to the CEO through social activities, and the fraction of all directors connected to the 
CEO through the current employment, prior employment, education, and/or social activity in 
columns (3) to (5). In all cases, our coefficients of interest remain unaffected.   
Alternative samples 
 Finally, we examine two alternative samples. We address the possibility that firms outside of 
S&P500, specifically S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600, may introduce biases due to the 
differential coverage of directors in the most prominent firms. In column (6), we restrict our analysis 
to the subsample of S&P500 firms. The coefficient on Connectedness (%) remains significantly 
negative, and the magnitude of the coefficient increases. Lastly, we test our baseline Logit regression 
with Connectedness (%) two fiscal years before (requiring the same CEO two fiscal years before). The 
use of a two-year lagged variable alleviates the possibility of CEOs appointing their friends to the 
board prior to an acquisition. Column (7) uses a two-year lagged measure of boardroom 
connectedness, Connectedness (%)t-2, on a sample that is restricted to firms with the same CEO two 
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fiscal years before. Compared to column (2) of Table 3, the magnitude of the estimate is more 
negative and remains significant.  
Overall, the results obtained from using alternative samples and proxies of boardroom 
connectedness do not change the results we obtain from previous sections. CEOs with friends in 
the boardroom appear to prefer a quiet life.  
 
5.3 Alternative Proxies for Managerial Risk-Taking 
CEOs may derive utility from lower idiosyncratic risk they face, given their large and 
undiversified positions in the firms they manage (Jin 2002). Furthermore, Amihud and Lev (1981) 
find that manager has incentive to diversify to lower employment risks. In this sub-section, we test 
the impact of CEO-board ties on unobservable managerial actions to reduce risks. We rely on 
realized stock return volatility and idiosyncratic volatility during the fiscal year as alternative proxies 
for managerial risk-taking. 
We use three estimation strategies: firm fixed and random effects panel regression, and first-
difference panel regression with instrumental variable. The dependent variable is the proxy for 
managerial risk-taking. All the independent variables are measured at the start of a fiscal year. Panel 
C of Table 8 reports the regression results.  
Historical stock return volatility 
Column (1) shows the results for fixed effects panel regression. The annualized stock return 
volatility is lower with higher boardroom connectedness. Factors that heighten stock return volatility 
are higher Tobin’s Q and higher leverage, while factors that lower stock return volatility are higher 
market capitalization, and higher cash flow, consistent with Low (2009). Column (2) repeats the 
analysis with random effects panel regression, the result remains robust. Finally, as CEOs may 
strategically appoint their friends on board in response to firm uncertainty, the direction of causality 
is hard to establish. Column (3) addresses endogeneity concern with first-difference panel regression 
using the death of connected independent directors as the instrumental variable used in Table 3 
column (5) and (6). Similar to column (1) to (2), boardroom connectedness lowers stock return 
volatility. 
Idiosyncratic volatility 
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We turn to idiosyncratic volatility (the root mean square error from the Fama-French three 
factor market model estimated using a firm's daily stock return over the fiscal year, multiplied by the 
square root of the number of trading days) to examine the effect of boardroom connectedness on 
firm-specific risks8
Overall, the results using the two alternative proxies of corporate risk-taking support the 
main hypothesis that CEOs with friends in the boardroom prefers a quiet life.  
. Column (4) shows the results for fixed effects panel regression. Idiosyncratic 
volatility is lower with higher boardroom connectedness. Column (5) to (6) show the same 
conclusion with alternative estimation procedures. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Informal social links between top executives and directors are a prevalent feature in many 
countries. In many cases, top executives enjoy an elite education, share membership in prestigious 
social and professional associations, and sit on the boards of large firms. This paper attempts to 
investigate the impact of informal social networks in the boardroom on corporate risk-taking in 
corporate control activities in a large sample of U.S. firms from 2000 to 2010.  
We document that firms with connected boards are less likely to pursue mergers and 
acquisitions. Firms with close CEO-board connections are less likely to choose focus acquisitions 
and more likely to undertake mergers with stock payment. Social ties in the boardroom do not 
enhance firm value in M&A context. A higher level of boardroom connection is associated with a 
lower level of short-term stock performance and a lower subsequent ROA. Our results are robust to 
different specifications of the empirical model, and to alternative explanations and proxies for risk-
taking.  
                                                          
8  Idiosyncratic risk is the risk that is unique to a specific firm. Following Fu (2009), we measure the 
idiosyncratic risk of an individual stock in the following steps. First, for each fiscal year, we regress daily excess returns 
of individual stocks on the daily Fama-French three factors: (i) the excess return on a broad market portfolio (Rm – rf), 
(ii) the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks (SMB, 
small minus big), and (iii) the difference between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return 
on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks (HML, high minus low): 
 Riτ – rτ = αit + bit (Rmτ – rτ) + sitSMBτ + hitHMLτ + εiτ 
τ is the subscript for the day and t is the subscript for the fiscal year, τ ∈t , and bi , si , and hi are factor sensitivities or 
loadings. Daily stock returns are obtained from the CRSP. We download the daily factor data from Kenneth R. French’s 
website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). Then, we perform a time-series 
regression for each stock in each fiscal year. Idiosyncratic volatility of a stock is the root-mean-square-error from the 
market model. We then annualize idiosyncratic volatility by multiplying it by the square root of the number of trading 
days in that fiscal year. 
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Overall, our paper highlights the impact of social networks in the boardroom on CEO and 
firm behavior in major corporate decisions. Evidence from our paper indicates that social ties 
between a CEO and directors are associated with a lower level of corporate risk-taking in M&A 
activities that undermine firm value. Our results seem to support the “quiet life” hypothesis by 
Betrand and Mullinathan (2003) and Aggarwal and Samwick (2006). Insulated from board 
monitoring, socially connected CEOs appear to prefer not to take risk, or to take a low level of risk 
to active empire-building at the expense of shareholder value.  
  
  26 
 
REFERENCES 
Acharya, Viral V., Amihud, Yakov, and Litov, Lubomir. 2011. Creditor rights and corporate 
risk-taking. Journal of Financial Economics 102(1): 150–166. 
Adams, R. B., and Ferreira, Daniel. 2007. A theory of friendly boards. Journal of Finance 62(1): 
217–250. 
Agarwal, Anup, Cooper, Tommy, Lian, Qin, and Wang, Qiming. 2012. Common advisors in 
mergers and acquisitions: Determinants and consequences. Working paper.  
Aggarwal, Rajesh K., and Samwick, Andrew A. 2003. Why do managers diversify their firms? 
Agency reconsidered. Journal of Finance 58: 71-118. 
 
Aggarwal, Rajesh K., and Samwick, Andrew A.  2006. Empire-builders and shirkers: Investment, 
firm performance, and managerial incentives. Journal of Corporate Finance 12: 489–515. 
 
Amihud, Yakov, and Lev, Baruch. 1981. Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate 
mergers. Bell Journal of Economics 12(2): 605–617. 
 
Anderson, R.C., and Reeb, D. M. 2003. Founding-family ownership, corporate diversification, 
and firm leverage. Journal of Law and Economics 46: 653–84. 
 
Andrade, Gregor, Mitchell, Mark, and Stafford, Erik. 2001. New evidence and perspectives on 
mergers. Journal of Economic Perspectives 15: 103–120. 
 
Arikan, Asli M., and Stulz, René M. 2011. Corporate acquisitions, diversification, and the firm’s 
life cycle. Working paper.  
 
Armstrong, Christopher S., and Vashishtha, Rahul. 2012. Executive stock options, Differential 
risk-taking incentives, and firm value. Journal of Financial Economics 104(1): 70–88. 
 
Barber, B., and Palmer, D. 2001. Challengers, elites, and owning families: A social class theory of 
corporate acquisitions in the 1960s. Administrative Science Quarterly 46: 87–120. 
 
Barber, B., Palmer, D., and J. Wallace. 1995. Determinants of conglomerate and predatory 
acquisitions: Evidence from the 1960s. Journal of Corporate Finance 1: 283–318. 
 
Barber, B., Palmer, D., Zhou, X., and Soysal, Y. 1995. The friendly and predatory acquisition of 
large U.S. corporations in the 1960s: The other contested terrain. American Sociological Review 60: 
469–499. 
 
Barnea, A., and Guedj, I. 2007. But mom, all other kids have one!—CEO Compensation and 
director networks. Working paper.  
 
Bates, Thomas W., Becher, David A., and Lemmon, Michael L. 2008. Board classification and 
managerial eEntrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control. Journal of Financial 
Economics 87(3): 656–677. 
 
  27 
 
Bebchuk, Lucian A., Cohen, Alma, and Ferrell, Allen. 2009. What matters in corporate 
governance? Review of Financial Studies 22: 783–827. 
 
Bebchuk, Lucian A., Cremers, Martijn K.J., and Peyer, Urs C. 2011. The CEO pay slice. Journal 
of Financial Economics 102(1): 199–221. 
 
Berger, P., and Ofek, E. 1999. Causes and effects of corporate refocusing programs. Review of 
Financial Studies 12: 311–345. 
 
Bertrand, Marianne, and Mullainathan, Sendhil. 2003. Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate 
governance and managerial preferences. Journal of Political Economy 111(5): 1043–1075. 
 
Bertrand, Marianne, and Schoar, Antoinette. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers 
on firm policies. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(4): 1169–1208. 
 
Billett, Matthew T., Garfinkel, Jon A., and Jiang, Yi. 2011. The influence of governance on 
investment: Evidence from a hazard model. Journal of Financial Economics 102(3): 643–670. 
 
Boone, Audra L., Lie, Eric, and Liu, Yixin. 2010. Mixed-payment deals and target shareholder 
preferences for method of payment. Working paper. 
Brown, S.J., and Warner, J.B. 1985. Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies. Journal of 
Financial Economics 14: 3–31. 
 
Cai, Ye, and Sevilir, Merih. 2012. Board connections and M&A transactions. Journal of Financial 
Economics 103: 327–349. 
 
Cain, Matthew D., and McKeon, Stephen B. 2012. Cleared for takeoff? CEO personal risk-
taking and corporate policies. Working paper.  
 
Campa, Jose M. and Kedia, Simi. 2002. Explaining the diversification discount. Journal of Finance 
57: 1731–1762. 
 
Capron, Laurence, and Shen, Jung-Chin. 2007. Acquisitions of private vs. public firms: Private 
information, target selection, and acquirer returns. Strategic Management Journal 28: 891–911. 
 
Chevalier, Judith, and Ellison, Glenn. 1999. Are some mutual fund managers better than others? 
Cross-sectional patterns in behavior and performance. Journal of Finance 54: 875–899. 
 
Cohen, Lauren, Malloy, Christopher, and Frazzini, Andrea. 2008. The small world of investing: 
Board connections and mutual funds returns. Journal of Political Economy 116(5): 951–79. 
 
Coles, Jeffrey L., Daniel, Naveen D., and Naveen, Lalitha. 2006. Managerial incentives and 
risk-taking. Journal of Financial Economics 79: 431–468. 
 
  28 
 
Comment, Robert, and Jarrell, Greg A. 1995. Corporate focus and stock returns. Journal of Finance 
37: 67–87. 
 
Denis, David, Denis, Diane, and Sarin, Atulya. 1997. Agency problems, equity ownership, and 
corporate diversification. Journal of Finance 52: 135–60. 
 
Do, Quoc-Anh, Lee, Yen-Teik, and Nguyen, Bang Dang. 2012. Political connections and firm 
value: Evidence from close gubernatorial elections. Working paper. 
 
Do, Quoc-Anh, Lee, Yen-Teik, Nguyen, Bang Dang, and Nguyen, Trang. 2012. Out of sight, 
out of mind: The value of political connections in social networks. Working paper.  
 
Eckbo, B. Espen, Giammarino, Ronald M., and Heinkel, Robert L. 1990. Asymmetric 
information and the medium of exchange in takeovers: Theory and tests. Review of Financial Studies 
3: 651–675. 
 
Engelberg, Joseph, Gao, Pengjie, and Parsons, Christopher A. 2012. Friends with money. 
Journal of Financial Economics 103(1): 169–188. 
 
Erel, Isil, Liao, Rose C., and Weisbach, Michael S. 2011. Determinants of cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions. Working paper. 
 
Faccio, Mara, and Masulis, Ron. 2005. The choice of payment method in European mergers and 
acquisitions. Journal of Finance 60(3): 1345–1388. 
 
Faccio, Mara, Marchica, Maria-Teresa, and Mura, Roberto. 2011. Large shareholder 
diversification and corporate risk-taking. Review of Financial Studies 24(11): 3601–3641. 
 
Faccio, Mara, Marchica, Maria-Teresa, and Mura, Roberto. 2012. CEO gender, corporate risk-
taking, and the efficiency of capital allocation. Working paper.  
 
Fracassi, Cesare, and Tate, Geoffrey. 2012. External networking and internal firm governance. 
Journal of Finance 67(1):153–194. 
 
Fu, Fangjian. “Idiosyncratic Risk and the Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns.” Journal of 
Financial Economics, 2009, 91(1), pp. 24-37. 
 
Gorton, Gary, Kahl, Matthias, and Rosen, Richard J. 2009. Eat or be eaten: A theory of mergers 
and firm size. Journal of Finance 64(3): 1291–1344. 
 
Gormley, Todd A., Matsa, David A, and Milbourn, Todd. 2011. CEO compensation and 
corporate risk-taking: Evidence from a natural experiment. Working paper.  
 
Graham, John R., Lemmon, Michael L. and Wolf Jack. G. 2002. Does corporate diversification 
destroy value? Journal of Finance 57(2): 695–720. 
 
Güner, Burak, Malmendier, Ulrike, and Tate, Geoffrey. 2008. Financial expertise of directors. 
Journal of Financial Economics 88 (2): 323–354. 
  29 
 
 
Hallock, K. 1997. Reciprocally interlocking boards of directors and executive compensation. Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 32: 331–344. 
 
Hansen, Robert G. 1987. A theory for the choice of exchange medium in mergers and acquisitions. 
Journal of Business, 60: 75–95. 
 
Harford J., Humphery-Jenner, M., and Powell, Ronan. 2012. The sources of value destruction 
in acquisitions by entrenched managers. Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming. 
 
Harford, Jarrad, and Li, Kai. 2007. Decoupling CEO wealth and firm performance: The case of 
acquiring CEOs. Journal of Finance 62(2): 917–949. 
 
Harford J.,Mansi S., and Maxwell W. F. 2008. Corporate governance and a firm's cash holdings. 
Journal of Financial Economics 87: 535–55.  
 
Hermalin, B. E., and Weisbach, M. S.. 1998. Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their 
monitoring of the CEO. American Economic Review 88(1): 96–118.  
 
Hilary, G., and Hui, K.W. 2009. Does religion matter in corporate decision making in America? 
Journal of Financial Economics 93: 455–473.  
 
Hochberg, Y., Ljungqvist, A., and Y. Lu. 2007. Whom you know matters: Venture capital 
networks and investment performance. Journal of Finance 62: 251–301. 
 
Hochberg, Y., Ljungqvist, A. and Y. Lu. 2010. Networking as a barrier to entry and the 
competitive supply of venture capital. Journal of Finance 65: 829–859. 
 
Hutton, Irena, Jiang, Danlin, and Kumar, Alok. 2011. Do Republican managers adopt 
conservative corporate policies? Working paper.  
 
Hwang, Byoung-Hyoun, and Kim, Seoyoung. 2009. It pays to have friends. Journal of Financial 
Economics 93 (1): 138–158. 
 
Ishii, Joy and Xuan, Yuhai. 2010. Acquirer-target social ties and merger outcomes. Working 
paper.  
 
Jaganathan, Murali, Stephens, Clifford P., and Weisbach, Michael S. 2000. Financial flexibility 
and the choice between dividends and stock Repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 57(3): 355–
384. 
 
Jensen, Michael C. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. 
American Economic Review 76: 323–329. 
 
Jensen, Michael C., and Meckling, William H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305–360. 
 
  30 
 
Jin, Li. 2002. CEO compensation, diversification, and incentives. Journal of Financial Economics  66(1): 
29–63. 
 
Kramarz, F., and Thesmar, D. 2012. Social networks in the boardroom. Journal of the European 
Economic Association, forthcoming. 
 
Kuhnen, C. M. 2009. Business networks, corporate governance and contracting in the mutual fund 
industry.  Journal of Finance 64(5): 2185–2220. 
 
Jung, Kooyul, Kim, Yong Cheol, and Stulz, Rene M. 1996. Timing, investment opportunities, 
managerial discretion, and the security issue decision. Journal of Financial Economics 42(2): 159–185. 
 
Larcker, D., Richardson, S., Seary, A. and Tuna, I. 2005. Back door link between directors and 
executive compensation. Working paper.  
 
Lehn, Kenneth, and Zhao, Mengxin. 2006. CEO turnover after acquisitions: Do bad bidders get 
fired? Journal of Finance 61(4):1759–1811. 
 
Levi, M., Li, K., and Zhang, F. 2010. Deal or no deal: Hormones and the mergers and 
acquisitions game. Management Science 56(9): 1462–1483. 
 
Loughran, Time, and Ritter, Jay. 2004,. Why has IPO underpricing changed over time? Financial 
Management 33(3): 5–37. 
 
Low, Angie. 2009. Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation. Journal of 
Financial Economics 92(3): 470–490. 
 
Malmendier, Ulrike, and Geoffrey A. Tate. 2005. CEO overconfidence and corporate 
investment. Journal of Finance 60(6): 2660–2700. 
 
Malmendier, Ulrike, Tate, Geoffrey, and Yan, Jon. 2008. Who makes acquisitions? CEO 
confidence and the market’s reaction. Journal of Financial Economics 89(1): 20–44. 
 
Malmendier, Ulrike, Tate, Geoffrey, and Yan, Jon. 2011. Overconfidence and early-life 
experiences: The effect of managerial traits on corporate financial policies. Journal of Finance 65(5): 
2661–2700. 
 
Martin, Kenneth J. 1996. The method of payment in corporate acquisitions, investment 
opportunities, and management ownership. Journal of Finance 51: 1227–1246. 
 
Masulis, Ronald W., Wang, Cong. and Xie, Fei. 2007. Corporate governance and acquirer 
returns. Journal of Finance 62(4): 1851–1889. 
 
Masulis, Ronald W., Wang, Cong, and Xie, Fei. 2009. Agency problems at dual-class companies. 
Journal of Finance 64(4): 1697–1727. 
 
 
  31 
 
May, Don O. 1995. Do managerial motives influence firm risk reduction strategies? Journal of Finance 
50(4):1291–1308. 
 
Meyers, Stewart C., and Majluf, Nicholas S. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions 
when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13(2): 187–
221. 
 
Milgram, S. 1967. The small world problem. Psychology Today  2: 7–60. 
 
Mills, C. 1956. The power elite. Oxford, New York. 
 
Minton, Bernadette A., Taillard,  Jérôme P. A., and Williamson, Rohan. 2010. Do 
independence and financial expertise of board matter for risk taking and performance? Working 
paper.  
 
Mitchell, Mark L., and Lehn, Kenneth. 1990. Do bad bidders become good targets? Journal of 
Political Economy  98: 372–398. 
 
Morck, Randall, Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert W. 1990. Do managerial incentives drive 
bad acquisitions? Journal of Finance 45: 31–48. 
 
Muscarella, Chris, and Zhao, Jing. 2011. Promoting the quiet life or risk-taking? CEO severance 
contracts and managerial decision-making. Working paper.  
 
Myers, Stewart C. 1984. The capital structure puzzle. Journal of Finance, 39: 575–592. 
 
Netter, Jeffry; Stegemoller, Mike and Wintoki, M. Babajide. 2011. Implications of data screens 
on merger and acquisition analysis: A large sample study of mergers and acquisitions from 1992 to 
2009. Review of Financial Studies 24(7): 2316–2357.  
 
Neyman, J., and Scott, E.L. 1948. Consistent estimation from partially consistent observations. 
Econometrica, 16: 1-32. 
 
Nguyen, Bang Dang. 2012. Does the rolodex matter? Corporate elite’s small world and the 
effectiveness of boards of directors. Management Science 58 (2): 236–252. 
 
Pfeffer, J., and Salancik, G. 2003. The external control of organizations: A resource dependence 
perspective. Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, CA.  
 
Phillips, Gordon M., and Zhdanov, Alexei. 2011. R&D and the market for acquisitions. Working 
paper. 
 
Puhani, P. 2000. The Heckman correction for sample selection and its critique. Journal of Economic 
Surveys 14: 53–68. 
 
Roussanov, Nikolai, and Savor, Pavel. 2012. Status, marriage, and managers' attitudes to risk. 
Working paper. 
  32 
 
 
Schmidt, Breno. 2008. Costs and benefits of “friendly” boards during merger and acquisitions. 
Working paper.  
 
Serfling, Matthew A. 2012. CEO age, underinvestment, and agency costs. Working paper.  
 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert W. 1989. Management entrenchment: The case of manager-
specific investments. Journal of Financial Economics 25: 123–139. 
 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert W. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of 
Finance 52: 737–783. 
 
Simon, C., and Warner, J.  1992. Matchmaker, matchmaker: The effect of old boy networks on job 
match quality, earnings, and tenure. Journal of Labor Economics 10: 306–330. 
 
Smith, C. W., and Stulz, R. M. 1985.The determinants of firms' hedging policies. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 20: 391–405. 
 
Stulz, Rene M. 1990. Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies. Journal of Financial 
Economics 26: 3–27. 
 
Useem, M. 1984. The inner circle. Oxford University Press, New York.  
 
Wasserman, S., and Fraust, K. 1997. Social networks analysis. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK.  
 
Watts, D. 1999. Small worlds. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.  
 
Weisbach, M. 1995. CEO turnover and the firm’s investment decisions. Journal of Financial Economics 
37: 159–188. 
 
Williams, J. 1987. Perquisites, risk, and capital structure. Journal of Finance 42: 29–48. 
 
Yim, Soojin. 2010. The acquisitiveness of youth: CEO age and acquisition behavior. Working 
paper.  
 
 
33 
 
Appendix A: Variable Definitions and Constructions 
Variable Name Variable Definitions and Constructions Source 
CEO-Board Connections 
Connectedness (%) The fraction of independent directors connected to the CEO. CEO-
director social ties are measured by the percentage of directors connected 
to the CEO through current employment (directors and the CEO 
currently serve in at least one common outside firm), prior employment 
(director and the CEO had served in at least one common outside 
company, excluding the current one), education (directors and the CEO 
attended the same university program within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and 
Malloy 2008)), and social activities (directors and the CEO share active 
membership in at least one non-profit organization (Fracassi and Tate 
2012)) 
BoardEx 
Connectedness - 
Overall (%) 
The fraction of all directors connected to the CEO. CEO-director social 
ties are defined as above 
BoardEx 
Connectedness - 
Education (%) 
The fraction of independent directors connected to the CEO through 
education: the director and CEO attended the same university program 
within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008) 
BoardEx 
Connectedness - 
Current Employment (%) 
The fraction of independent directors connected to the CEO through 
current employment: both the director and CEO now serve in at least one 
common outside of the company in question 
BoardEx 
Connectedness - 
Past Employment (%) 
The fraction of independent directors connected to the CEO through past 
employment: the director and CEO both served in at least one common 
outside company (prior roles in the company in question are excluded) 
BoardEx 
Connectedness - 
Social Activities (%) 
The fraction of independent directors connected to the CEO through 
social activities: the director and CEO share active membership in at least 
one non-profit organization 
BoardEx 
Financial Experience (%) The fraction of all directors with past or current experience as a CFO, 
Treasurer, Accountant, or Vice President for Finance 
BoardEx 
Financial Education (%) The fraction of all directors with an MBA, CPA, CFA, or a degree in 
economics, management, accounting, or business 
BoardEx 
   Firm Characteristics 
Market Value of Equity Market value of total equity (CSHO*PRCC_F) CRSP 
Assets Total assets (AT) at (t-1) Compustat 
Q Total assets - total shareholder's equity + market value of total equity 
(CSHO*PRCC_F), scaled by total assets at (t) 
Compustat 
Leverage Book value of debts (DLC + DLTT) over book value of total assets (DLC 
+ DLTT + CEQ) at (t) 
Compustat 
Cash flow Income before extraordinary items (t) + Depreciation (t) , scaled by total 
assets (t-1) 
Compustat 
Industry Herfindahl Index The Herfindahl index for each industry is defined as the sum of squared 
market shares, where market share is based on firm market capitalization, 
and industry classification is based on three-digit SIC 
Compustat 
Idiosyncratic Volatility The root mean square error from the Fama-French three factor market 
model estimated using a firm's daily stock return over the fiscal year, 
multiplied by the square root of the number of trading days 
CRSP,  
Fama French 
Factors 
ROA Income before extraordinary items (t), scaled by total assets (t-1) Compustat  
Segments 
Institutional Shareholding The percentage of shares owned by institutional investors Thomson Reuters 
Institutional  
Holdings (13F) 
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CEO Characteristics 
CEO Age (Yrs) CEO’s age (in years) ExecuComp 
CEO Tenure (Yrs) The time (in years) the CEO has been with his firm ExecuComp 
CEO Shareholding (%) SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS + OPT_EXER_NUM, scaled by the firm's 
outstanding shares 
ExecuComp 
CEO Pay over Top 5 
Executives (%) 
The fraction of CEO's aggregate compensation (TDC1) over those of the 
top-five executive team in the firm, as defined by Bebchuk, Cremers, and 
Peyer (2011) 
ExecuComp 
CEO Flying License Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO has small aircraft pilot license, 0 otherwise 
(Cain McKeon 2012) 
Federal 
Aviation Admin 
   Board Characteristics 
Board Size Board size BoardEx 
Independent Dir. (%) Percentage of independent directors in the firm BoardEx 
Max Board Tenure (Yrs) The maximum tenure of board of directors in the firm BoardEx 
Max Board Age (Yrs) The maximum age of board of directors in the firm BoardEx 
Mean Board Tenure (Yrs) The average tenure of board of directors in the firm BoardEx 
Mean Board Age (Yrs) The average age of board of directors in the firm BoardEx 
   M&A Deal Characteristics 
Acquirer's Marketcap Log of acquirer's market value of equity at 41th trading days prior to 
M&A announcement 
CRSP 
Acquirer's Tobin's Q Acquirer's Q (as defined above) Compustat 
Acquirer's Leverage Acquirer's leverage (as defined above) Compustat 
Acquirer's Cash Flow Acquirer's cash flow (as defined above) Compustat 
Transactions Value Deal value (from SDC) SDC 
Relative Deal Size Deal value (from SDC) over bidder market value of equity at the 41th 
trading day prior to announcement date 
SDC 
Public Target Dummy variable: 1 if the target is a public firm, 0 otherwise SDC 
Private Target Dummy variable: 1 if the target is a private firm, 0 otherwise SDC 
Subsidiary Target Dummy variable: 1 if the target is a subsidiary, 0 otherwise SDC 
All Stock Deal Dummy variable: 1 if the M&A is purely stock-financed deals, 0 otherwise SDC 
All Cash Deal Dummy variable: 1 if the M&A is purely cash-financed deals, 0 otherwise SDC 
Focus M&A Dummy variable: 1 if bidder and target shares the same SIC2, 0 otherwise SDC 
Stock Run-Up Acquirer's buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) during the period        
[-210,-11], and the market index is the CRSP value-weighted return 
CRSP 
Tender Offer Dummy variable: 1 if the M&A involves tender offer, 0 otherwise SDC 
Cross Border Dummy variable: 1 if the M&A involves cross border transaction, 0 
otherwise 
 
Competed Dummy variable: 1 if number of bidders is greater than 1 SDC 
Merger of Equals Dummy variable: 1 if the M&A is a merger of equals, 0 otherwise SDC 
High Tech Dummy variable: 1 if acquirer and target are both from high tech 
industries as defined by Loughran and Ritter (2004), 0 otherwise 
SDC 
Serial Dummy variable: 1 if the acquirer makes at least 3 acquisitions during the 
sample period 
SDC 
Governance Dummy variable: 1 if acquiring firm’s Entrenchment index (as defined by 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009) is greater or equal to 3 
Risk Metrics/ 
IRRC 
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Appendix B: BoardEx Database 
BoardEx database is provided by Management Diagnostics Ltd., a private research company 
that focuses on collecting and distributing social network information on corporate officers of the 
U.S. and European public and private companies. For U.S. companies, BoardEx collects 
biographical information on senior executives and directors from the public sources, such as SEC 
filings (8K filings, proxy statements, annual reports), company press releases, corporate website, U.S. 
stock exchanges, and press sources (for example, Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times). BoardEx 
started collecting data on U.S. companies in 2003, beginning with firms with the largest market 
capitalization. BoardEx extends the historical profile of each director and executive back to 2000. 
The coverage of U.S. firms increases further in 2005, with details of these new firms traced back to 
2003. These profiles cover the individual awards, work experience, education, social activities (for 
example, university endowment fund, charities, or club memberships). Any BoardEx-covered 
director or executive has full historical profile, except for those who left the firm before 2000 and 
didn’t reenter. To verify the completeness of the CEO identification on our data, we merge our 
BoardEx sample with the CEO data from ExecComp for firm-years shared by both datasets. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Firms and Boardroom Connections     
            This table reports summary statistics of CEO-board connection and CEO, firm, and board characteristics. Panel A reports boardroom connections between a 
CEO and directors, derived from BoardEx. Connectedness (%) and Connectedness – Overall (%) are the fraction of independent directors and the fraction of all 
directors connected to the CEO, respectively. CEO-director social ties are measured by the percentage of directors connected to the CEO through current 
employment (directors and the CEO currently serve in at least one common outside firm), prior employment (director and the CEO had served in at least one 
common outside company, excluding the current one), education (directors and the CEO attended the same university program within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, 
and Malloy 2008)), and social activities (directors and the CEO share active membership in at least one non-profit organization (Fracassi and Tate 2012)). A 
board is more (less) connected if Connectedness (%) is above (below) the median of the sample’s connectedness. Panel B shows the CEO characteristics, 
including CEO age (in years), CEO tenure (in years), and CEO pay over top 5 executives (in percentage). Panel C reports board characteristics, including board 
size, fraction of independent directors (in percentage), maximum director tenure (in years), maximum director age (in years), average director tenure (in years), 
and average director age (in years). Panel D reports firm characteristics, including market value of equity, cash flow (scaled by lagged total assets), Tobin's Q, 
leverage (book value of debts over book value of total assets), and Industry HHI (measured as the sum of the squares of market share of each firm in the same 
three-digit SIC).Panel E reports the correlation matrix between Connectedness (%) and its components (fraction of independent directors connected to the CEO 
through current employment, prior employment, education, and education). 
            
Variables 
Full Sample  More-Connected Board Less-Connected Board     
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Diff. p-value 
            Panel A: CEO-Board Connection 
           Connectedness (%) 0.192 0.111 0.250 0.362 0.286 0.242 0.007 0.000 0.025 0.355 0.000 
Connectedness - Overall (%) 0.186 0.111 0.222 0.329 0.273 0.218 0.032 0.000 0.071 0.297 0.000 
Connectedness - Current Employment (%) 0.061 0.000 0.165 0.110 0.000 0.215 0.007 0.000 0.036 0.103 0.000 
Connectedness - Past Employment (%) 0.118 0.000 0.193 0.208 0.125 0.227 0.020 0.000 0.060 0.188 0.000 
Connectedness - Education (%) 0.004 0.000 0.022 0.007 0.000 0.029 0.001 0.000 0.009 0.006 0.000 
Connectedness - Other Activities (%) 0.075 0.000 0.124 0.133 0.111 0.146 0.012 0.000 0.038 0.121 0.000 
            Panel B: CEO Characteristics 
           CEO Age (Years) 55.555 56.000 7.211 56.251 56.000 7.006 54.808 55.000 7.351 1.443 0.000 
CEO Tenure (Years) 5.235 3.500 5.890 5.513 3.800 5.910 4.935 3.000 5.853 0.578 0.000 
CEO Pay over Top 5 Executives (%) 0.376 0.378 0.125 0.383 0.385 0.122 0.368 0.369 0.129 0.015 0.005 
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Variables 
Full Sample  More-Connected Board Less-Connected Board     
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Diff. p-value 
 
Panel C: Board Characteristics 
           Board Size 9.661 9.000 2.668 10.192 10.000 2.802 9.087 9.000 2.385 1.105 0.000 
Independent Directors (%) 0.750 0.778 0.145 0.765 0.800 0.132 0.733 0.750 0.156 0.032 0.000 
Mean Board Age (Years) 59.906 60.077 3.964 60.096 60.250 3.817 59.701 59.857 4.106 0.395 0.000 
Max Board Age (Years) 71.491 71.000 5.706 71.465 71.000 5.510 71.519 71.000 5.910 -0.054 0.585 
Mean Board Tenure (Years) 8.635 8.076 4.028 8.288 7.813 3.962 9.008 8.340 4.064 -0.720 0.000 
Max Board Tenure (Years) 19.825 17.950 10.941 18.834 17.000 11.102 20.892 18.900 10.664 -2.058 0.000 
            Panel D: Firm Characteristics 
           Market Value of Equity 8,710 1,921 26,335 11,028 2,450 30,498 6,197 1,463 20,632 4,832 0.000 
Cash flow 0.093 0.091 0.131 0.087 0.083 0.138 0.099 0.100 0.123 -0.012 0.000 
Q 1.867 1.456 1.310 1.766 1.383 1.209 1.978 1.554 1.404 -0.212 0.000 
Leverage 0.346 0.338 0.861 0.391 0.385 0.296 0.297 0.290 1.202 0.094 0.000 
Industry HHI 0.200 0.139 0.185 0.189 0.127 0.181 0.212 0.152 0.188 -0.023 0.000 
 
 
Panel E: Correlation Matrix Connectedness (%) Connectedness - Current Emp. (%) 
Connectedness -  
Past Emp. (%) 
Connectedness - 
Education (%) 
Connectedness - 
Other Activities (%) 
Connectedness (%) 
1     
     
Connectedness - Current Emp. (%) 0.683 
1    
(0.000)     
Connectedness - Past Emp. (%) 0.842 0.689 
1   
(0.000) (0.000)    
Connectedness - Education (%) 0.102 0.012 0.006 
1  
(0.000) (0.152) (0.483)   
Connectedness - Other Activities (%) 0.559 0.126 0.147 0.070 
1 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Mergers and Acquisitions 
            This table reports summary statistics of our sample of mergers and acquisitions from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions 
database between 2000 and 2010. The sample consists of 2,897 completed U.S. merger and acquisitions with an explicit change of control when the acquirer 
owns less than 50% of the target prior to the transaction and purchases 50% or more of the target’s shares in the transaction. The value of each deal must be at 
least $1 million, or more than 1% of acquirer's market capitalization on the 41th trading day prior to the announcement date. Panel A presents the distribution 
of M&A announcements in our sample. Panel B shows deal characteristics, covering transactions value (in $ million), relative deal size (transactions value, 
scaled by acquirer's market capitalization), payment method (all stock deal and all cash deal), public target, and focus deals (acquirer and target have the same 
two-digit SIC code). Panel C reports the CEO-directors connectedness (%) of acquiring firms, derived from BoardEx. Connectedness (%) is the fraction of 
independent directors connected to the CEO. CEO-director social ties are measured by the percentage of directors connected to the CEO through current 
employment (directors and the CEO currently serve in at least one common outside firm), prior employment (director and the CEO had served in at least one 
common outside company, excluding the current one), education (directors and the CEO attended the same university program within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, 
and Malloy 2008)), and social activities (directors and the CEO share active membership in at least one non-profit organization (Fracassi and Tate 2012)). A 
board is more (less) connected if Connectedness (%) is above (below) the median of the sample’s connectedness. Panel D shows acquiring CEO characteristics, 
including CEO age (in years), CEO tenure (in years), and CEO pay over top 5 executives (in percentage). Panel E reports acquiring board characteristics, 
including board size, the fraction of independent directors (in percentage), average director age (in years), maximum director age (in years), average board 
tenure (in years), and maximum board tenure (in years). Panel F reports acquiring firm characteristics, including market value of equity (in $ millions), cash flow 
(scaled by lagged total assets), leverage (book value of debts over book value of total assets), Tobin's Q, and Industry HHI (measured as the sum of the squares 
of market share of each firm in the same three-digit SIC). 
            Panel A: Sample distribution by announcement year 
        
Year M&A Target Types Payment Method Two-digit SIC Connectedness (%) Public Private Subsi. All Share Mixed All Cash Focus Diversify More Less 
            2000 190 79 61 50 55 93 42 116 74 100 90 
2001 238 87 75 76 54 126 58 150 88 130 108 
2002 239 54 92 93 25 131 83 137 102 115 124 
2003 264 49 111 104 21 140 103 168 96 143 121 
2004 292 66 125 101 21 151 120 188 104 152 140 
2005 309 75 138 96 15 163 131 189 120 178 131 
2006 331 86 134 111 20 168 143 191 140 164 167 
2007 337 86 157 94 8 174 155 203 134 175 162 
2008 241 52 114 75 12 116 113 154 87 103 138 
2009 174 38 74 62 6 82 86 109 65 87 87 
2010 282 60 125 97 10 132 140 150 132 132 150 
Total 2,897 732 1,206 959 247 1,476 1,174 1,755 1,142 1,479 1,418 
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Variables Full Sample  More-Connected Board Less-Connected Board     Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median Std. Dev. Diff. p-value 
            Panel B: Deal Characteristics            Transactions Value 923 150 3,858 1,220 189 4,752 613 114 2,584 607 0.000 
Relative Deal Size 0.148 0.056 0.286 0.156 0.056 0.311 0.140 0.057 0.259 0.016 0.152 
All Stock Deal 0.085 0.000 0.279 0.108 0.000 0.310 0.062 0.000 0.241 0.046 0.000 
All Cash Deal 0.405 0.000 0.491 0.384 0.000 0.487 0.427 0.000 0.495 -0.043 0.018 
Public Target 0.253 0.000 0.435 0.296 0.000 0.457 0.207 0.000 0.406 0.089 0.000 
Private Target 0.416 0.000 0.493 0.369 0.000 0.483 0.465 0.000 0.499 -0.096 0.000 
Focus 0.606 1.000 0.489 0.602 1.000 0.490 0.609 1.000 0.488 -0.007 0.705 
            Panel C: CEO-Board Connection            Connectedness (%)  0.189 0.125 0.232 0.342 0.286 0.227 0.029 0.000 0.079 0.313 0.000 
Connectedness (%) - Overall 0.183 0.125 0.203 0.309 0.273 0.199 0.051 0.000 0.093 0.258 0.000 
Connectedness - Current Employment (%) 0.046 0.000 0.129 0.066 0.000 0.154 0.023 0.000 0.089 0.043 0.000 
Connectedness - Past Employment (%) 0.116 0.000 0.173 0.164 0.111 0.191 0.062 0.000 0.130 0.102 0.000 
Connectedness - Education (%) 0.004 0.000 0.024 0.006 0.000 0.029 0.002 0.000 0.016 0.004 0.004 
Connectedness - Other Activities (%) 0.067 0.000 0.107 0.091 0.000 0.117 0.039 0.000 0.086 0.052 0.000 
            Panel D: CEO Characterisitics            CEO Age (Years) 54.445 54.000 7.196 55.184 55.000 7.003 53.673 53.000 7.315 1.511 0.000 
CEO Tenure (Years) 4.863 3.400 5.009 5.343 3.800 5.196 4.362 2.800 4.756 0.981 0.000 
CEO Pay over Top 5 Executives (%) 0.386 0.383 0.131 0.396 0.392 0.127 0.375 0.372 0.135 0.021 0.000 
            Panel E: Board Characteristics            Board Size 9.668 9.000 3.058 10.247 9.000 3.445 9.061 9.000 2.452 1.186 0.000 
Independent Directors (%) 0.736 0.769 0.148 0.745 0.778 0.138 0.727 0.750 0.157 0.018 0.001 
Mean Board Age (Years) 59.149 59.400 4.199 59.466 59.667 4.084 58.818 59.154 4.292 0.648 0.000 
Max Board Age (Years) 70.964 70.000 6.070 71.081 70.000 5.809 70.842 70.000 6.332 0.239 0.311 
Mean Board Tenure (Years) 7.997 7.544 3.835 7.833 7.491 3.953 8.169 7.642 3.702 -0.336 0.024 
Max Board Tenure (Years) 18.032 16.200 10.414 17.129 15.900 10.757 18.977 16.800 9.959 -1.848 0.000 
            Panel F: Firm Characteristics            Market Value of Equity 8,760 2,094 23,667 11,112 2,747 26,796 6,307 1,672 19,598 4,804 0.000 
Cash flow 0.107 0.104 0.116 0.099 0.092 0.108 0.114 0.114 0.123 -0.015 0.002 
Q 1.949 1.575 1.499 1.838 1.521 1.132 2.065 1.640 1.797 -0.227 0.000 
Leverage 0.308 0.331 1.459 0.379 0.376 0.261 0.233 0.301 2.065 0.146 0.011 
Industry HHI 0.167 0.110 0.166 0.162 0.098 0.174 0.172 0.125 0.157 -0.010 0.111 
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Table 3: Boardroom Connections and Likelihood of M&A 
This table reports the relationship between boardroom connection and the likelihood of mergers and acquisitions. 
The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a firm in BoardEx dataset completes at least one merger or 
acquisition during the fiscal year. Column (1) reports the results for logit regression. Column (2) controls for year 
fixed effects. Column (3) controls for industry fixed effects. Column (4) includes the interaction term Connectedness 
(%) x Merger Wave, measured as the number of acquisitions in the firm's industry. Column (5) shows the first-stage 
results for first-difference panel with instrumental variable. The instrument, Deceased Connected Independent Director, is 
the number of independent directors with ties to the CEO who have died within one a year, up to the current 
fiscal year. Column (6) reports the results for the second-stage regression. Our M&A sample is extracted from the 
Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database between 2000 and 2010, and includes 
completed U.S. merger and acquisitions with an explicit change of control when the acquirer owns less than 50% 
of the target prior to the transaction and purchases 50% or more of the target’s shares in the transaction. The value 
of each deal must be at least $1 million, or more than 1% of acquirer's market capitalization on the 41th trading 
day prior to the announcement date. Connectedness (%) is the fraction of independent directors connected to the 
CEO. CEO-director social ties are measured by the percentage of directors connected to the CEO through current 
employment (directors and the CEO currently serve in at least one common outside firm), prior employment 
(director and the CEO had served in at least one common outside company, excluding the current one), education 
(directors and the CEO attended the same university program within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008)), 
and social activities (directors and the CEO share active membership in at least one non-profit organization 
(Fracassi and Tate 2012)). Industry classification is based on three-digit SIC codes. All explanatory variables are 
measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. Standard errors in the parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
Dependent  Variable: Indicator for Takeover 
Specification: Logit FD IV 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Connectedness (%) -0.314** -0.384** -0.372** -0.563*** 
 
-1.488** 
 
(0.147) (0.150) (0.163) (0.175) 
 
(0.734) 
Connectedness (%) x Merger Wave 
   
0.011** 
  
    
(0.005) 
  Log(Market Value of Equity) 0.131*** 0.134*** 0.139*** 0.135*** 0.0023 0.036** 
 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.0019) (0.016) 
Q -0.149*** -0.158*** -0.181*** -0.156*** -0.0015 -0.017* 
 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.038) (0.033) (0.0010) (0.010) 
Leverage -0.380*** -0.415*** -0.606*** -0.432*** 0.0003 0.014*** 
 
(0.127) (0.140) (0.161) (0.144) (0.0005) (0.002) 
Cash flow 0.328 0.395 0.708* 0.390 -0.0061 -0.013 
 
(0.381) (0.400) (0.426) (0.399) (0.0098) (0.045) 
Past Return 0.251*** 0.219*** 0.211*** 0.216*** 0.0018** 0.002 
 
(0.043) (0.044) (0.053) (0.044) (0.0009) (0.010) 
Merger Wave 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.003 0.009*** (0.0000) 0.006*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0001) (0.001) 
Board Size -0.017 -0.023 -0.021 -0.026 -0.0043*** -0.007 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.0009) (0.007) 
Independent Directors (%) -0.356 0.258 0.041 0.280 -0.0081 -0.071 
 
(0.240) (0.289) (0.298) (0.290) (0.0175) (0.106) 
Max Board Age (Years) -0.005 -0.001 -0.007 -0.002 0.0006 0.006** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.0004) (0.003) 
Max Board Tenure (Years) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.009** -0.011*** -0.0001 -0.002 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0003) (0.002) 
CEO Age (Years) -0.013** -0.013** -0.007 -0.013** -0.0003 -0.001 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.0004) (0.004) 
CEO Tenure (Years) 0.002 0.003 -0.004 0.002 0.0005 0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.0005) (0.005) 
Deceased Connected Independent Director     
-0.0804*** 
 
     
0.0135  
 Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes No No No 
Observations 8,860 8,860 8,452 8,860 7,581 7,581 
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Table 4: Boardroom Connections and Focus Mergers and Acquisitions 
This table reports the relationship between boardroom connections and the likelihood of focus acquisitions that 
involve targets in industries with the same two-digit SIC code. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a 
firm in BoardEx dataset completes at least one focus merger or acquisition during the fiscal year.  Column (1) 
reports the results for logit regression.  Column (2) includes interaction term Connectedness (%) x Merger Wave, which 
is the number of acquisitions in the firm's industry. Column (3) reports the second-stage results for the first-
difference panel with instrumental variable. The instrument, Deceased Connected Independent Director, is the number of 
independent directors with ties to the CEO who have died within one a year, up to the current fiscal year. Our 
sample is extracted from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database between 
2000 and 2010, and includes completed U.S. merger and acquisitions with an explicit change of control when the 
acquirer owns less than 50% of the target prior to the transaction and purchases 50% or more of the target’s shares 
in the transaction. The value of each deal must be at least $1 million, or more than 1% of acquirer's market 
capitalization on the 41th trading day prior to the announcement date. Connectedness (%) is the fraction of 
independent directors connected to the CEO. CEO-director social ties are measured by the percentage of directors 
connected to the CEO through current employment (directors and the CEO currently serve in at least one 
common outside firm), prior employment (director and the CEO had served in at least one common outside 
company, excluding the current one), education (directors and the CEO attended the same university program 
within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008)), and social activities (directors and the CEO share active 
membership in at least one non-profit organization (Fracassi and Tate 2012)). Industry classification is based on 
three-digit SIC codes. All explanatory variables are measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. Standard errors 
denoted in the parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable: Indicator for Focus Takeover 
Specification: Logit FD IV 
Model: (1) (2) (3) 
Connectedness (%) -0.504** -0.742*** -1.343* 
 
(0.198) (0.242) (0.718) 
Connectedness (%) x Merger Wave  0.011*  
  
(0.006) 
 Log(Market Value of Equity) 0.115*** 0.112*** 0.002 
 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.014) 
Q -0.168*** -0.167*** -0.009 
 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.008) 
Leverage -0.914*** -0.924*** 0.013*** 
 
(0.217) (0.218) (0.002) 
Cash flow 0.205 0.198 -0.042 
 
(0.395) (0.393) (0.043) 
Past Return 0.170*** 0.169*** 0.013 
 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.008) 
Merger Wave 0.003 0.001 0.005*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001) 
Board Size -0.031 -0.030 -0.000 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.006) 
Independent Directors (%) -0.431 -0.412 -0.062 
 
(0.341) (0.343) (0.085) 
Max Board Age (Years) -0.007 -0.007 0.002 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.002) 
Max Board Tenure (Years) -0.011** -0.011** -0.003* 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) 
CEO Age (Years) -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) 
CEO Tenure (Years) -0.005 -0.006 0.004 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes No 
Observations 8,002 8,002 7,581 
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Table 5: Boardroom Connections and the Choice of Payment Method in Mergers and Acquisitions 
This table reports the relationship between boardroom connections and the percentage of stock payment, from a 
double-sided tobit regression (censored at 0 and 1). The dependent variable is the percentage of equity financing 
for each merger or acquisition. Column (1) reports the tobit results. Column (2) includes the interaction term 
Connectedness (%) x Merger Wave, measured as the number of acquisitions in the firm's industry. Column (3) includes 
the interaction term Connectedness (%) x HHI, measured as the sum of the squares of market share of each firm in 
the same industry. Column (4) includes the interaction term Connectedness (%) x Focus (involving targets in industries 
with the same two-digit SIC code). Our sample is extracted from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) U.S. 
Mergers and Acquisitions database between 2000 and 2010, and includes completed U.S. merger and acquisitions 
with an explicit change of control when the acquirer owns less than 50% of the target prior to the transaction and 
purchases 50% or more of the target’s shares in the transaction. The value of each deal must be at least $1 million, 
or more than 1% of acquirer's market capitalization on the 41th trading day prior to the announcement date. 
Connectedness (%) is the fraction of independent directors connected to the CEO. CEO-director social ties are 
measured by the percentage of directors connected to the CEO through current employment (directors and the 
CEO currently serve in at least one common outside firm), prior employment (director and the CEO had served in 
at least one common outside company, excluding the current one), education (directors and the CEO attended the 
same university program within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008)), and social activities (directors and the 
CEO share active membership in at least one non-profit organization (Fracassi and Tate 2012)). To account for 
sample selection, we include Inverse Mills Ratio, estimated using probit model (2) in Table 3. Industry 
classification is based on three-digit SIC codes. All explanatory variables are measured at the beginning of the fiscal 
year. Standard errors denoted in the parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, **, 
and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Specification: Dependent Variable: Percentage of Stock Payment 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connectedness (%) 1.570** 1.109 1.870*** 0.707 
 
(0.684) (0.719) (0.688) (0.720) 
Connectedness (%) x Merger Wave  0.011**   
  
(0.005)   Connectedness (%) x HHI   -2.977***  
   
(1.112)  Connectedness (%) x Focus    1.137*** 
    
(0.390) 
HHI   0.380  
   
(0.369)  Focus    -0.048 
    
(0.117) 
Log(Market Value of Equity) -0.204 -0.150 -0.169 -0.190 
 
(0.191) (0.190) (0.190) (0.190) 
Q 0.377 0.299 0.327 0.367 
 
(0.310) (0.307) (0.307) (0.309) 
Leverage 0.871 0.654 0.713 0.831 
 
(0.678) (0.682) (0.678) (0.674) 
Cash flow -2.375** -2.113** -2.237** -2.324** 
 
(0.965) (0.955) (0.959) (0.960) 
Past Return -0.335 -0.233 -0.269 -0.330 
 
(0.402) (0.399) (0.399) (0.402) 
Merger Wave -0.016 -0.013 -0.013 -0.015 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Board Size 0.088** 0.077** 0.082** 0.086** 
 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) 
Independent Directors (%) -0.915* -0.816* -0.851* -0.817* 
 
(0.470) (0.469) (0.467) (0.463) 
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Specification: (Con’t) Dependent Variable: Percentage of Stock Payment 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Max Board Age (Years) 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Max Board Tenure (Years) 0.013 0.007 0.010 0.013 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
CEO Age (Years) 0.016 0.012 0.014 0.017 
 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
CEO Tenure (Years) 0.017** 0.017** 0.018** 0.017** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -4.324 -3.295 -3.707 -4.188 
 
(3.731) (3.711) (3.707) (3.721) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,908 1,908 1,908 1,908 
Pseudo R2 0.0928 0.0946 0.0954 0.0981 
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Table 6: Boardroom Connections and Firm Value and Performance following Mergers and Acquisitions  
             This table reports the impact of boardroom connection on firm value and performance following mergers and 
acquisitions. Our sample is extracted from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions 
database between 2000 and 2010, and includes completed U.S. merger and acquisitions with an explicit change of 
control when the acquirer owns less than 50% of the target prior to the transaction and purchases 50% or more of 
the target’s shares in the transaction. The value of each deal must be at least $1 million, or more than 1% of 
acquirer's market capitalization on the 41th trading day prior to the announcement date. Connectedness (%) is the 
fraction of independent directors connected to the CEO. CEO-director social ties are measured by the percentage 
of directors connected to the CEO through current employment (directors and the CEO currently serve in at least 
one common outside firm), prior employment (director and the CEO had served in at least one common outside 
company, excluding the current one), education (directors and the CEO attended the same university program 
within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008)), and social activities (directors and the CEO share active 
membership in at least one non-profit organization (Fracassi and Tate 2012)). A board is more (less) connected if 
Connectedness (%) is above (below) the median of the sample’s connectedness. Focus M&A deals are the ones that 
involve targets in industries with the same two-digit SIC code. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  
Panel A reports the acquirer's cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the (-2, +2) windows (5 days) around M&A 
announcement. Average abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model around the M&A 
announcement day (Day 0), using daily data over a 200-day (-240,-41) period. Panel B reports the results for OLS 
regression. Column (1) to (3) show the acquirer’s CAR across different event windows. Column (4) reports the 
change in operating performance (ROA) around M&A announcement. Acquirer’s characteristics include market 
capitalization, Tobin's Q, leverage (book value of debts over market value of total assets), and cash flow (scaled by 
lagged total assets). Deal characteristics include relative deal size (transaction value over acquirer's market 
capitalization), indicator for focus acquisition (acquirer and target have the same two-digit SIC code), public target, 
all stock payment, stock run-up (buy-and-hold abnormal return during the period [-210,-11]), indicator variables 
for tender offer, cross-border, competed (more than one bidder), merger of equals, high tech combinations 
(Loughran and Ritter 2004), serial acquirer (more than three acquisitions during the sample period), and indicator 
for governance (taking value of 1 if Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk et al. 2009) is greater than the median). To 
account for sample selection, we include Inverse Mills Ratio, estimated using probit model (2) in Table 3. All 
explanatory variables are measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. Standard errors in the parentheses are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. 
 
             Panel A: Acquirer's Cumulative Abnormal Returns around M&A Announcements 
 
Full Focus Diversify 
Sample Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Full 0.0026 ** 0.0016 ** 0.0035 ** 0.0021 ** 0.0012  0.0008  
N  2,897 1,755 1,142 
More Connected Board  -0.0002  -0.0012  0.0002  -0.0020  -0.0007  0.0000  
N 1,479 891 588 
Less Connected Board 0.0055 *** 0.0040 *** 0.0069 *** 0.0054 *** 0.0032  0.0010 ** 
N  1,418 864 554 
Difference -0.0056 ** -0.0051 *** -0.0067 ** -0.0074 *** -0.0039   -0.0009   
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Panel B: Acquirer's Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Change in Operating Performance 
Dependent Variable: CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-2,+2] CAR [-3,+3] ΔROA[-1,+1] 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connectedness (%) -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.034*** -0.031** 
 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) 
Connectedness (%) x Focus 0.033*** 0.040*** 0.048*** 0.032 
 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) 
Focus -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
Log(Market Value of Equity) -0.002 -0.002** -0.003** 0.004** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Q -0.004** -0.004* -0.004** 0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Leverage -0.000 0.000 0.001* -0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Cash flow 0.005 0.009 -0.000 -0.596*** 
 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.027) (0.075) 
Relative Size -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.027** 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) 
Public Target -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.015* 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) 
All Stock Deal -0.017** -0.019** -0.021** -0.038* 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.020) 
Stock Run-Up -0.004 -0.012** -0.014** 0.028*** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) 
Tender Offer 0.011 0.012 0.014* 0.017 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) 
Cross Border 0.008 -0.017 -0.006 0.078* 
 
(0.005) (0.014) (0.010) (0.041) 
Competed 0.006 0.005 0.007 -0.012 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.024) 
Merger of Equals -0.022 -0.013 -0.023 0.051* 
 
(0.021) (0.025) (0.036) (0.028) 
High Tech -0.006* -0.006 -0.009* -0.013* 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
Serial  -0.000 -0.004 -0.003 0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Governance 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.005 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.009 0.010 0.002 0.027** 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,908 1,908 1,908 1,893 
R2 0.070 0.070 0.064 0.333 
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Table 7: Boardroom Connections and Decisions to Acquire 
This table reports the results for the multinomial logit model. The dependent variable for column (1) equals one 
(two) if a firm takes at least one acquisition and the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the acquisition 
announcement is negative (positive), and equals zero if the firm is not an acquirer. Column (2) includes the 
interaction term of connectedness and merger wave, measured as the number of acquisitions in the firm's industry. 
CARs are computed using a five-day window, (-2,+2), where day zero is the event date. For firms with more than 
one acquisition in the same year, weighted average CAR is computed based on deal value. D_Acq=1 is for value 
destroying acquisitions, and D_Acq=2 is for value-creating acquisitions. Our sample is extracted from the 
Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database between 2000 and 2010, and includes 
completed U.S. merger and acquisitions with an explicit change of control when the acquirer owns less than 50% 
of the target prior to the transaction and purchases 50% or more of the target’s shares in the transaction. The value 
of each deal must be at least $1 million, or more than 1% of acquirer's market capitalization on the 41th trading 
day prior to the announcement date. Connectedness (%) is the fraction of independent directors connected to the 
CEO. CEO-director social ties are measured by the percentage of directors connected to the CEO through current 
employment (directors and the CEO currently serve in at least one common outside firm), prior employment 
(director and the CEO had served in at least one common outside company, excluding the current one), education 
(directors and the CEO attended the same university program within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008)), 
and social activities (directors and the CEO share active membership in at least one non-profit organization 
(Fracassi and Tate 2012)). All explanatory variables are measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. Standard errors 
denoted in the parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Model: (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: Value-Destroying Value-Creating Value-Destroying Value-Creating 
Connectedness (%) -0.142 -0.620*** -0.468** -0.592*** 
 
(0.180) (0.195) (0.210) (0.221) 
Connectedness (%) x Merger Wave 
  
0.016*** -0.001 
   
(0.006) (0.007) 
Log(Market Value of Equity) 0.173*** 0.098*** 0.175*** 0.098*** 
 
(0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) 
Q -0.124*** -0.203*** -0.122*** -0.204*** 
 
(0.037) (0.042) (0.037) (0.042) 
Leverage -0.429*** -0.401*** -0.444*** -0.416*** 
 
(0.139) (0.138) (0.142) (0.141) 
Cash flow -0.020 0.991* -0.023 0.985* 
 
(0.275) (0.527) (0.274) (0.527) 
Past Return 0.217*** 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.213*** 
 
(0.050) (0.048) (0.050) (0.049) 
Merger Wave 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Board Size 0.012 -0.062*** 0.008 -0.061*** 
 
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) 
Independent Directors (%) 0.184 0.354 0.223 0.355 
 
(0.361) (0.365) (0.362) (0.366) 
Max Board Age (Years) -0.008 0.004 -0.008 0.005 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Max Board Tenure (Years) -0.008* -0.013** -0.008* -0.013*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
CEO Age (Years) -0.017** -0.011 -0.016** -0.011 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
CEO Tenure (Years) 0.001 0.004 -0.000 0.004 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 8,860 8,860 
Pseudo R2 0.0341 0.0351 
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Table 8: Robustness Tests  
Panel A: Boardroom Connections and the Likelihood of Mergers and Acquisition  
        This panel presents the determinants of an M&A using logit models. The dependent variable indicates whether 
there is at least one completed M&A during the fiscal year. Column (1) controls for Financial Expertise (%), defined 
as the percentage of directors with past or current experience as a CFO, Treasurer, Accountant, or Vice President 
for Finance. Column (2) controls for Financial Education (%), defined as the percentage of directors with an MBA, 
CPA, CFA, or a degree in economics, management, accounting, or business. Column (3) controls for managerial 
entrenchment, defined as firms with entrenchment index (Bebchuk et al 2004) greater than the median. Column (4) 
controls for institutional shareholdings. Column (5) controls for CEO shareholding. Column (6) controls for the 
fraction of CEO pay over the top 5 executives (Bebchuk et al 2011). Column (7) controls for the CEO with flying 
license (Cain Mckeon 2012). Our sample is extracted from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers 
and Acquisitions database between 2000 and 2010, and includes completed U.S. merger and acquisitions with an 
explicit change of control when the acquirer owns less than 50% of the target prior to the transaction and 
purchases 50% or more of the target’s shares in the transaction. The value of each deal must be at least $1 million, 
or more than 1% of acquirer's market capitalization on the 41th trading day prior to the announcement date. 
Connectedness (%) is the fraction of independent directors connected to the CEO. CEO-director social ties are 
measured by the percentage of directors connected to the CEO through current employment (directors and the 
CEO currently serve in at least one common outside firm), prior employment (director and the CEO had served in 
at least one common outside company, excluding the current one), education (directors and the CEO attended the 
same university program within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008)), and social activities (directors and the 
CEO share active membership in at least one non-profit organization (Fracassi and Tate 2012)).  All explanatory 
variables are measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. Standard errors denoted in the parentheses are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable: Indicator for Takeover 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Connectedness (%) -0.372** -0.371** -0.415*** -0.392** -0.365** -0.376** -0.382** 
 
(0.150) (0.150) (0.151) (0.158) (0.151) (0.149) (0.150) 
Financial Expertise (%) 0.302 
      
 
(0.336) 
      Financial Education (%) 
 
0.423** 
     
  
(0.209) 
     Entrenchment 
  
0.190** 
    
   
(0.074) 
    Institutional Holdings 
   
0.121** 
   
    
(0.047) 
   CEO shareholding 
    
-0.434 
  
     
(0.758) 
  CEO Pay Slice 
     
0.825*** 
 
      
(0.257) 
 CEO Flying License 
      
0.112 
       
(0.171) 
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Dependent Variable: Indicator for Takeover 
Model: (Con’t) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log(Market Value of Equity) 0.135*** 0.133*** 0.149*** 0.116*** 0.130*** 0.132*** 0.134*** 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Q -0.157*** -0.158*** -0.155*** -0.140*** -0.160*** -0.151*** -0.158*** 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Leverage -0.417*** -0.417*** -0.425*** -0.406*** -0.411*** -0.419*** -0.416*** 
 
(0.141) (0.140) (0.143) (0.148) (0.141) (0.139) (0.140) 
Cash flow 0.403 0.386 0.371 0.783 0.526 0.335 0.400 
 
(0.401) (0.402) (0.390) (0.490) (0.412) (0.393) (0.399) 
Past Return 0.218*** 0.221*** 0.208*** 0.219*** 0.236*** 0.213*** 0.219*** 
 
(0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.050) (0.037) (0.044) (0.044) 
Merger Wave 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Board Size -0.023 -0.023 -0.028 -0.007 -0.021 -0.019 -0.023 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Independent Directors (%) 0.253 0.202 0.206 0.111 0.203 0.075 0.258 
 
(0.289) (0.291) (0.289) (0.318) (0.294) (0.293) (0.289) 
Max Board Age (Years) -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Max Board Tenure (Years) -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
CEO Age (Years) -0.013** -0.012** -0.014** -0.012* -0.014** -0.014** -0.013** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
CEO Tenure (Years) 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,860 8,860 8,860 7,430 8,514 8,807 8,860 
Pseudo R2 0.0349 0.0355 0.0359 0.0358 0.0346 0.0365 0.0349 
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Panel B: Alternative Measures of Boardroom Connection 
This panel presents the logit regressions for alternative outcome variables, alternative measures of social 
connections, and subsample of S&P500 firms. The dependent variable for column (1) and (2) indicates whether 
there is at least one completed M&A whose value is greater than $5 million and $10million, respectively, during the 
fiscal year. Column (3) shows the results using the fraction of directors connected to the CEO through current 
employment. Column (4) presents the results using the fraction of directors connected to the CEO through social 
activities. Column (5) shows the results using the fraction of all directors connected to the CEO. Column (6) 
shows the results using the sample of S&P500 firms. Column (7) restricts the sample to firms with the same CEO 
two fiscal years before, and presents the results using Connectedness (%)t-2. Connectedness (%) is the fraction of 
independent directors connected to the CEO. CEO-director social ties are measured by the percentage of directors 
connected to the CEO through current employment (directors and the CEO currently serve in at least one 
common outside firm), prior employment (director and the CEO had served in at least one common outside 
company, excluding the current one), education (directors and the CEO attended the same university program 
within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008), and social activities (directors and the CEO share active 
membership in at least one non-profit organization (Fracassi and Tate 2012). All explanatory variables are 
measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. Standard errors in the parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Alternative Outcome Alternative Measures of Connectedness Alternative Sample 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
5mio 10mio Current 
Employment 
Social 
Activities 
Connected 
Board 
S&P500 T-2 
Connectedness (%) -0.376** -0.359** -0.614*** 
    
 
(0.150) (0.151) (0.223) 
    Current Employment (%) 
   
-0.821*** 
   
    
(0.280) 
   Social Activity (%) 
    
-0.437** 
  
     
(0.171) 
  Connected Board (%) 
     
-0.596** 
 
      
(0.248) 
 Connectedness (%)t-2 
      
-0.440** 
       
(0.171) 
Log(Market Value of Equity) 0.138*** 0.151*** 0.127*** 0.138*** 0.134*** 0.085 0.134*** 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.054) (0.032) 
Q -0.160*** -0.165*** -0.156*** -0.155*** -0.158*** -0.099** -0.215*** 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.050) (0.047) 
Leverage -0.413*** -0.398*** -0.400*** -0.422*** -0.414*** -0.328* -0.291** 
 
(0.140) (0.138) (0.137) (0.141) (0.140) (0.182) (0.135) 
Cash flow 0.464 0.469 0.398 0.409 0.408 -0.431 0.856* 
 
(0.417) (0.427) (0.395) (0.399) (0.399) (0.587) (0.485) 
Past Return 0.221*** 0.231*** 0.220*** 0.216*** 0.219*** 0.155* 0.252*** 
 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.080) (0.060) 
Merger Wave 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Board Size -0.023 -0.023 -0.026 -0.023 -0.022 -0.010 -0.023 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.026) (0.020) 
Independent Directors (%) 0.275 0.257 0.208 0.305 0.209 0.760 0.389 
 
(0.289) (0.290) (0.288) (0.290) (0.289) (0.475) (0.362) 
Max Board Age (Years) -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.016 -0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) 
Max Board Tenure (Years) -0.011*** -0.010** -0.010** -0.009** -0.011*** -0.014* -0.010** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) 
CEO Age (Years) -0.014** -0.013** -0.014** -0.013** -0.013** -0.018** -0.013* 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
CEO Tenure (Years) 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.017* 0.003 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,860 8,860 8,860 8,860 8,860 3,243 6,687 
Pseudo R2 0.0351 0.0355 0.0351 0.0353 0.0348 0.0375 0.0353 
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Panel C: Alternative Proxies for Risk Taking 
This panel reports the firm panel regressions between 2000 and 2010. Realized volatility is the standard deviation 
of a firm’s daily stock return over the fiscal year, multiplied by the square root of the number of trading days. 
Idiosyncratic volatility is the root mean square error from the Fama-French three factor market model estimated 
using a firm's daily stock return over the fiscal year, multiplied by the square root of the number of trading days. 
Column (1) and (4) present the results for fixed effects panel regression. Column (2) and (5) present the results for 
random effects panel regression. Column (3) and (6) present the second-stage results for a first-difference panel 
regression with an instrument variable. The instrument, Deceased Connected Independent Director, is the number of 
independent directors with ties to the CEO who have died within one year, up to the current fiscal year (See Table 
3, column (6)). Connectedness (%) is the fraction of independent directors connected to the CEO. CEO-director 
social ties are measured by the percentage of directors connected to the CEO through current employment 
(directors and the CEO currently serve in at least one common outside firm), prior employment (director and the 
CEO had served in at least one common outside company, excluding the current one), education (directors and 
the CEO attended the same university program within a year (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008)), and social 
activities (directors and the CEO share active membership in at least one non-profit organization (Fracassi and 
Tate 2012)). All explanatory variables are measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. Standard errors in the 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Outcome: Realized Volatility Implied Volatility 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Specification: FE RE FD IV FE RE FD IV 
Connectedness (%) -0.095*** -0.080*** -0.520* -0.060*** -0.059*** -0.375* 
 
(0.028) (0.014) (0.266) (0.021) (0.012) (0.204) 
Log(Market Value of Equity) -0.095*** -0.053*** -0.204*** -0.100*** -0.057*** -0.149*** 
 
(0.013) (0.004) (0.012) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011) 
Q 0.038*** 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.031*** 0.023*** 0.016*** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) 
Leverage 0.006*** 0.005** -0.001 0.004*** 0.004* -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Cash flow -0.150*** -0.232*** -0.019 -0.114*** -0.179*** -0.008 
 
(0.033) (0.064) (0.028) (0.023) (0.048) (0.022) 
Past Return -0.010 -0.011** -0.006 -0.003 -0.008** -0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Merger Wave -0.001*** -0.000** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Board Size 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Independent Directors (%) 0.025 -0.042** -0.266*** -0.059** -0.100*** -0.236*** 
 
(0.029) (0.021) (0.034) (0.024) (0.017) (0.031) 
Max Board Age (Years) -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Max Board Tenure (Years) 0.001 -0.001*** -0.001* 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001* 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
CEO Age (Years) -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001* -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
CEO Tenure (Years) 0.001 0.001** -0.000 0.001 0.001* 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Observations 8,818 8,818 7,581 8,818 8,818 7,581 
R2 0.443 0.1634 0.254 0.4202 0.2261 0.199 
 
 
 
 
